Well-Delineated Exceptions, Claims of Sham, and Fourfold Probable Cause by Haddad, James B.
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 68
Issue 2 June Article 6
Summer 1977
Well-Delineated Exceptions, Claims of Sham, and
Fourfold Probable Cause
James B. Haddad
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
This Criminal Law is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
James B. Haddad, Well-Delineated Exceptions, Claims of Sham, and Fourfold Probable Cause, 68 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 198
(1977)
THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY
Copyright © 1977 by Northwestern University School of Law
WELL-DELINEATED EXCEPTIONS, CLAIMS OF SHAM,
AND FOURFOLD PROBABLE CAUSE
JAMES B. HADDAD*
INTRODUCTION
For nearly four decades specialized legal ed-
ucation for prosecutors, criminal defense attor-
neys and police officers has been central to
Fred Inbau's efforts to improve criminal jus-
tice.' My role as an instructor in Inbau's train-
ing courses and, at his urging, in other pro-
grams and seminars, has taught me that per-
plexing problems of theory can quickly surface
during attempts to organize and present the
law in a manner which will serve the everyday
needs of law enforcement officers and lawyers.2
The unifying element in this essay's treatment
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
1 Inbau, for instance, founded and continues to
direct the Northwestern University Law School Short
Course for Prosecuting Attorneys, now in its thirty-
second year, and the Northwestern University Short
Course for Criminal Defense Attorneys, now in its
twentieth year. Each summer approximately eight
hundred attorneys attend these programs. Professor
Inbau's emphasis upon training is consonant with
what I view as a major theme of his life's work: a
dedication to the improvement of the reliability of
the fact-finding process in criminal litigation. Almost
everything he has done in his career has manifested
this same dedication: his work on scientific crime
analysis, first at what is now the Chicago Police
Crime Laboratory and later through publications
such as A. MOENSSENS, R. MOSES & F. INBAU,
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES (1973); his
concern for eliminating fallible eye-witness identifi-
cations, see Inbau, Book Review, 57 J. CRIM. L.C. &
P.S. 376 (1966); his emphasis upon interrogation
methods which would prompt only the guilty to con-
fess, see F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGA-
TION AND CONFESSIONS 218-19 (2d ed. 1967); and his
efforts to improve polygraph techniques. See J. REID
& F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION (2d ed. 1977).
2 Inbau often has observed that interaction with
attorneys is beneficial to law students and law teach-
ers. He no doubt agrees with the observation that
the law school of every great university should have
several truly educated faculty members so as to justify
its place in a university, see Kalven,ForM.P.S., 33 U.
CHI. L. REV. 193, 194 (1966); but he also believes that
every law school, including "national" law schools,
should have on its faculty several persons who, by
virtue of experience, can call themselves lawyers. On
occasion he has been frankly disappointed by the
devaluation of experience in the faculty-hiring proc-
ess.
of three fourth amendment topics is merely
that the ideas presented were generated by my
participation in Professor Inbau's programs.3
Lecturers foolish enough to tackle the entire
subject of warrantless searches and seizures-
the author included-often follow a common
pattern. They begin with a sentiment borrowed
from Supreme Court opinions: fourth amend-
ment warrantless intrusions are per se unrea-
sonable subject only to a few specially estab-
lished, well-delineated exceptions.' They then
list and discuss the various exceptions. My use
of this approach, as discussed in Part I of this
article, has convinced me that the well-deline-
ated exception proposition not only fails to
reflect present judicial practice but embodies
bad theory as well.
Part II resulted from reflections upon my
typical conclusion to a lecture to law enforce-
ment officers: a vague, too pious admonition
against police "misuse" of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement. My uneasiness with pul-
pit-like denunciation of police sham led me to
reevaluate various claims of sham in fourth
amendment litigation and to assess different
kinds of judicial responses to such claims.
Part III offers for consideration the "four-
fold probable cause" concept, an organizational
tool which I have found helpful in my presen-
tations. After explaining the concept, the arti-
cle argues that this analysis will aid our under-
standing of the legal requirements for search
warrants and for searches under many of the
exceptions to the warrant requirement. It will
also reveal several fourth amendment issues
3 Some of these ideas, although not developed,
have been reflected in unpublished written materials
distributed in connection with my lectures at the
Northwestern Short Courses. Others are scattered
through a handbook prepared in connection with a
seminar for Illinois lawyers: J. HADDAD, ARREST,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE (Ill. Inst. for Continuing Legal
Education 1976).
4 Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1970): Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
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which heretofore have been largely unex-
plored.
I. THE WELL-DELINEATED EXCEPTIONS
PRINCIPLE
A period of fourth amendment doctrinal
development which increasingly emphasized
the preference for search warrants culminated
in 1967 when the Supreme Court proclaimed
in Katz v. United States5 that "searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior judi-
cial approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-
subject only to a few specially established and
well delineated exceptions. '6 Since then a thou-
sand state and federal reviewing court opinions
have parroted the declaration. 7 Perhaps from
any perspective, but certainly from the vantage
point of a surveyor of the entire field of war-
rantless searches, the "well-delineated excep-
tions" principle appears at variance with reality.
Exceptions to the warrant requirement are
many, not few. Some of the most important,
far from being specially established, have
grown like weeds with barely any Supreme
Court attention. Some recognized exceptions
are not well delineated even in their broad
outlines, much less in their fine details. Of
greater significance to fourth amendment the-
ory, the Court has departed from its stated
principle by refusing to invalidate a search
merely because it did not fit within one of the
recognized exceptions. The Court's deviation
from Katz ought not be lamented, however.
The variance is more consonant with sound
fourth amendment theory than is the well-de-
lineated exception principle. What may be
5 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
6Id. at 357. The present article does not enter the
debate over the extent to which the emphasis upon
the need to utilize search warrants marks a funda-
mental departure from the concerns of the drafters
of the fourth amendment. Compare T. TAYLOR, Two
STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 21-43
(1969), with Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 398-400, 410-12
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Amsterdam). True to
history or not, long before Katz the emphasis upon
the search warrant requirement had become great.
See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499
(1958), where the Court claimed, "The exceptions to
the rule that a search must rest upon a search warrant
have been jealously and carefully drawn .... "
7 The figure of 1000 is a very rough estimate de-
rived with the help of a fellow who was demonstrating
computerized legal research.
more difficult to defend on theoretical grounds
is the Court's inversion of the rule, in accord-
ance with which the Supreme Court has upheld
as per se reasonable all searches falling within
one of the recognized exceptions, without re-
gard to all the circumstances of an individual
case.
The Myth of the Well-Delineated Exception
Only through a disingenuous use of multiple
sub-categories can distinct varieties of valid
warrantless searches be reduced to few in num-
ber.' There are searches incident to arrest9
and frisks following Terry stops.10 There are
jailhouse shakedowns" and inventory inspec-
tions. 2 There are warrantless searches author-
ized by consent 3 and warrantless searches au-
thorized by grand juries.14 At international
borders there are "ordinary" searches and strip
searches and body-cavity searches, each gov-
erned by different rules. 15 There are fixed-
checkpoint searches 6  and roving-patrol
searches. 7 There are emergency searches to
protect health and life,"8 emergency searches
to prevent the destruction of evidence, 9 and
8 The listing which follows excludes warrantless
seizures where no prior search took place (e.g.,
certain plain view seizures, arrests, and stops), al-
though the well-delineated exceptions principle
sometimes is said to apply to seizures as well as to
searches. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443,454-55,464,473 (1971).
9 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973);
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
10 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
11 United States v. Hitchcock, 467 F.2d 1107 (9th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 916 (1973).
12 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
13 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974);
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969).
14 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973);
United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 9 (1973).
"1 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266,
272 (1973) (dictum); United States v. Mastberg, 503
F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1974); Klein v. United States, 472
F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Shields,
453 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910
(1972).
16 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973).
1 United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
18 Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963); People v.
Smith, 47 Ill. 2d 161, 265 N.E.2d 139 (1970). See also
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
19 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966);
People v. Clark, 547 P.2d 267 (Colo. App. 1975).
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emergency searches in quest of fleeing felons .20
There are warrantless searches of open fields
2 1
and of vehicles stopped on open highways,
2 2 
of
probationers' and of parolees ,24 at courthouse
doors25 and at airport gates. 26 Courts have
sanctioned warrantless searches and inspections
under dozens of different regulatory schemes.27
Additionally, whatever was true in the days of
Pitt the Elder,2s the poorest man in his ruined
tenement may be required to permit govern-
ment agents to enter for a caseworker inspec-
tion or under any one of a half-dozen other
judicially-approved theories .2 9
20 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
21 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Saiken v. Bensin-
ger, 489 F.2d 865 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S, 910 (1974); Conrad v. State, 63 Wis 2d 616, 218
N.W.2d 252 (1974), which both involved extensive
searches of fields. See also Air Pollution Variance
Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp., 416 U.S. 861 (1974);
Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
22 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Car-
roll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
' People v. Chinnici, 51 Misc. 2d 570,273 N.Y.S.2d
538 (1966).
24 United States ex rel. Santos v. New York State
Board of Parole, 441 F.2d 1216 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1025 (1972).
25 Downing v. Kunzig, 454 F.2d 1230 (6th Cir. 1972).
26 United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir.
1974); United States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 947 (1972).
27 See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311
(1972); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States,
397 U.S. 72 (1970); People v. Palkes, 52 Ill. 2d 472,
288 N.E.2d 469 (1972), appeal dismissed, 411 U.S. 923
(1973).
28 Even a prosecutor lecturing other prosecutors,
so as to set a lofty tone, sometimes begins with the
familiar quotation from William Pitt (Earl of
Chatham), the history of which is treated in E.
FISHER, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 3 n.7 (1970):
Every man's house is called his castle. Why?
Because it is surrounded by a moat, or defended
by a wall? No. It may be a straw-built hut, the
wind may whistle around it, the rain may enter
it, but the King cannot .... The poorest man
may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the forces
of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may
shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm
may enter; the rain may enter; but the King of
England may not enter; all his forces dare not
cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.
The lecturer's tone seem somewhat less noble at the
place where he explains to his fellow prosecutors
how a judge might be convinced to accept a life-
health emergency theory if the officer entered the
home amidst a storm like that described by Pitt.
Some lectures would best be entitled, "Eight Ways
the King Can Enter."
29 Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). Besides
the welfare-home visit theory, some of the other
Although there are many recognized excep-
tions to the warrant requirement, some of those
most likely to affect our daily lives have not
been "specially established" either at common
law or by the United States Supreme Court.
Citizens returning to this country may be
searched at international borders or their func-
tional equivalents under doctrines which the
Supreme Court has never considered 20 Nor
has the Court ever considered the several kinds
of warrantless searches at airports, 31 by now a
familiar part of American life. In a single day
a lawyer may have his person or effects sub-
jected to a warrantless search at the entrance
to a federal office building, the entrance to a
county jail, and the entrance to a local court-
all under exceptions to the warrant require-
ment which have never been specially estab-
lished by the United States Supreme Court.
Over the years doctrines have evolved in lower
courts sanctioning the warrantless searches of
lockers which contain the possessions of school
children3 and of soldiers 33 of postal employ-
ees34 and of jail guards.3 5 Some lower courts
have recently recognized a doctrine which
probably is unfamiliar to most readers, the
theories justifying a warrantless entry into a home
include entry-to-arrest [under emergency or perhaps
non-emergency circumstances, compare People v.
Johnson, 45 Ill. 2d 283, 259 N.E.2d 57, cert. denied,
407 U.S. 914 (1970), with Dorman v. United States,
435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970)]; entry to prevent the
destruction of evidence, see note 37 infra; and entry
to protect life or health, see People v. Brooks, 7 Ill.
App. 3d 767, 289 N.E.2d 207 (1972).
30 The Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925), and in Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973), has made
approving references to border searches. Never,
however, has it considered what limits must be placed
upon such searches. Special rules for strip-searches
and body-cavity searches have been developed by
lower courts with no Supreme Court guidance. See
cases cited in note 15 supra.
31 Airport searches are justified under a number
of distinct theories. See Note, The Constitutionality of
Airport Searches, 72 MICH. L. REV. 128 (1973). Thus,
Supreme Court implied-consent decisions treating
other regulatory schemes cannot be said to "establish"
the scope and limitations of airport searches.
32 1n re Christopher W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105
Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973).
' See United States v. Roberts, 25 U.S.C.M.A. 39
(1976).
34 United States v. Bunkers, 521 F.2d 1217 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 989 (1975).
3- People v. Tidwell, 133 Ill. App. 2d 1, 266 N.E.2d
787 (1971).
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"homicide scene exception" to the warrant re-
quirement, even though neither that term nor
the concept appears in any Supreme Court
fourth amendment opinion .36
The Court has left unsettled even in major
respects the scope and limitations of certain
recognized exceptions. Under what circum-
stances can the police, without a warrant, enter
a home to search for a suspected criminal?
What circumstances would justify a warrantless
entry to prevent the destruction of evidence?
Although the Supreme Court has indicated
that both types of warrantless intrusions are
sometimes permissible, it has given almost no
guidance as to the kind and quantum of data
necessary to justify such searches.37 As to these
and other issues, lower courts have been left to
debate the dimensions of particular exceptions
to the warrant requirement. As a result, a
single federal agency may vary its standard
operating procedures from federal circuit to
federal circuit.38
Some persons might argue that judicial pop-
pycock about a few specially established, well-
delineated exceptions does no real harm. Per-
haps, indeed, the hyperbole serves as a salutary
reminder that police officers should not be
36 See, e.g., State v. Sample, 107 Ariz. 407, 489
P.2d 44 (1971), vacated sub nom. Sample v. Eyman,
469 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1972); People v. Wallace, 31
Cal. App. 3d 865, 107 Cal. Rptr. 659 (1973); State v.
Chapman, 250 A.2d 203 (Me. 1969); contra People v.
Williams, 557 P.2d 399 (Colo. 1976). See generally Had-
dad, Arrest, Search and Seizure: Six Unexamined Issues
in Illinois Law, 26 DEPAUL L. REv. 492, 505-10 (1977).
17 In Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15
(1948), the Court suggested warrantless entries to
prevent the destruction of evidence would be permis-
sible under some circumstances. Johnson, however,
invalidated a warrantless entry made by officers who
before they entered had substantial reason to believe
that evidence (opium) was going up in smoke.Johnson
thus has been read to support both the approval and
the disapproval of emergency entries to prevent the
destruction of evidence. See, e.g., Thomas v. Parett,
524 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1975). Similarly the Court has
never determined when something less than hot
pursuit will justify entry to arrest. Nor has it decided
whether a warrantless search of a building can be
made in quest of a suspect if there is less than
probable cause to believe that the suspect is within.
See generally Haddad, supra note 36, at 510-14.
38 Practices of Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice Agents have been altered to conform with the
views of particular federal circuits. See Fragomen,
Searching for Illegal Aliens: The Immigration Service
Encounters the Fourth Amendment, 13 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 82, 112-19 (1975).
quick to substitute their opinions about proba-
ble cause for the judgment of neutral judicial
officers and that trial judges should not be
eager to ratify warrantless intrusions. Never-
theless, as even the Supreme Court has recog-
nized implicitly while inverting the per se rule
of Katz, the well-delineated exceptions princi-
ple is at odds with sound fourth amendment
theory.
The Inversion of the Per Se Rule
The United States Supreme Court has uti-
lized warrantless search exceptions as guide-
lines for judging the reasonableness of govern-
mental intrusions, but it has not adhered to
the Katz declaration that a warrantless search is
per se unreasonable if none of the recognized
exceptions can accommodate its facts. Two
post-Katz decisions, United States v. Edwards39
and Cupp v. Murphy,40 demonstrate the truth
of this proposition. In Edwards the police ar-
rested a burglary suspect and placed him in a
jail cell overnight. Ten hours after the arrest,
authorities confiscated the arrestee's clothing
to have it examined for paint traces which
might link Edwards to the alleged crime. The
only "well-recognized exception" arguably rel-
evant to the situation was the doctrine of search
incident to arrest.41 That doctrine, however,
did not fit the facts of the case because the
search had not been substantially contempore-
aneous with the arrest. A search ten hours
after an arrest is simply not "incident"
thereto.41 A majority of the Court, neverthe-
less, upheld the search, asserting that the issue
was simply whether the "search itself was rea-
sonable. '43 Through a step-by-step analysis of
the facts surrounding the search, the Court
concluded that what had been done was no
more an unreasonable intrusion than would
have been permitted if the search had occurred
incident to the arrest before Edwards was
placed in the cell. In dissent, Mr. Justice Stew-
art, the author of the Katz decision, protested
that the Court had violated the "well-delineated
exceptions" principle by adjudging the intru-
39 415 U.S. 800 (1974).
40 412 U.S. 291 (1973),
4' The government conceded that other theories
were inapplicable. See 415 U.S. at 810 n.2 (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
42 See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367
(1964).
43 415 U.S. at 807.
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sion reasonable in the absence of an applicable
exception .4 Of course Stewart was correct. The
Court had violated the Katz principle for the
very reason which Stewart recognized: the ma-
jority had concluded that, under all pf the
circumstances of the case, the search had not
been unreasonable and, therefore, had not
violated the fourth amendment.
Stewart himself had departed from the Katz
principle a year earlier in writing for the major-
ity in Cupp v. Murphy.45 In that case Murphy
had voluntarily appeared at the police station
for questioning concerning the strangulation
of his wife. Over his objection and without a
search warrant, the police took scrapings from
beneath Murphy's fingernails. They then al-
lowed him to return home, not arresting him
until one month later. The majority agreed
that the taking of the scrapings had been a
search within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. It then upheld the intrusion as
akin to a search incident to arrest.46 The facts
of the case, of course, did not fall within that
exception. Where there is no arrest, there can
be no search incident to arrest.47 The Court,
however, without suggesting that any other
recognized exception fit the facts, engaged in a
general calculation of reasonableness which
took into account both the limited nature of
the intrusion and the need for swift action
before the evidence was destroyed .4 The Court
concluded simply that the officers had not
engaged in an unreasonable search within the
meaning of the fourth amendment.
49
Edwards and Murphy, and lower court deci-
sions like them,"0 are important to both practice
11 Id. at 809 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
45 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
46 Id. at 295-96.
47 Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 79-80 (1949).
48 412 U.S. at 296. Assuming that "evidence emer-
gency" by now constitutes a well-recognized excep-
tion, it is not clear that this category fits. Although
there was probable cause to arrest Murphy, it is not
clear that there was probable cause to believe that an
emergency search would yield evidence. Thus Mur-
phy was unlike Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966), an emergency search case where exigent cir-
cumstances plus search probable cause (or, perhaps,
a higher quantum of data) were held to justify a
warrantless intrusion against a suspect's person. See
text accompanying notes 189-91 infra.
49 412 U.S. at 296.
"
0
'See, e.g., People v. Boykin, 39 I11. 2d 617, 237
N.E.2d 460 (1968); People v. De Vito, 77 Misc. 2d
463, 353 N.Y.S.2d 990 (1974).
and theory. They demonstrate that the defense
has not necessarily triumphed if the prosecu-
tion, despite hauling-and-pulling, has failed to
fit the facts of a particular search within one of
the recognized exceptions. These decisions
show that the familiar trial tug-of-war to place
the facts inside or outside an exception may be
unessential to a judicial determination of rea-
sonableness." Edwards and Murphy show that
Mr. Justice Schaefer of the Supreme Court of
Illinois was correct when, not long after Katz,
he insisted that categories such as search inci-
dent to arrest and stop-and-frisk, while "help-
ful in establishing broad guidelines," do not by
themselves place absolute limits upon the au-
thority of law enforcement officers.52 Finally,
these cases demonstrate that adherence to the
well-delineated exceptions principle, through a
refusal to scrutinize all the facts of a particular
search, would lead to intolerable results in
some cases: the invalidation of reasonable
searches. In Edwards and Murphy a majority of
the Court, quite properly, was unwilling to
invoke the exclusionary rule where, viewing all
the facts, it concluded that the police officers
had acted reasonably. Neither the need to
uphold judicial integrity nor the hope to deter
police misconduct can justify the exclusion of
evidence which has been secured through rea-
sonable police practices. To be true to the
rationale of the exclusionary rule, and to ad-
here to the truism that the first clause of the
fourth amendment prohibits only unreasonable
searches and seizures, the Court in Murphy and
Edwards was required, at least implicitly, to
depart from the bad theory embodied in the
well-delineated exceptions principle.
On the other hand, if the exceptions to the
warrant requirement are merely guidelines to
reasonable conduct, and not by themselves dis-
positive of fourth amendment claims, it logi-
cally follows that the availability of a recognized
exception should not end all fourth amend-
51 This proposition is not as obvious as it may
seem to some. Recently in oral argument before a
distinguished federal reviewing court, a prosecutor
met substantial resistance when he asserted that it
was not essential for the court to characterize what
had occurred either as an "arrest" or as a mere
"stop." Some of the judges insisted that they had to
pigeonhole the police conduct before they could
evaluate its reasonableness. Contrast People v. Boykin,
39 I1. 2d 617, 237 N.E.2d 460 (1968).52 Id. at 620, 237 N.E.2d at 462.
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ment analysis. As Justice Schaefer has argued,
the categories by themselves ought not circum-
scribe the rights of citizens any more than they
should limit official authority.5 3 If the search is
unreasonable under all the facts, it should not
be upheld simply because the facts fit within
one of the well-recognized exceptions.
The United States Supreme Court, however,
has not been true to this logic. It has never
invalidated a warrantless search where the facts
fit within one of the recognized exceptions,
even where, under all the circumstances, the
search appeared unreasonable. Two other
post-Katz decisions, Texas v. White54 and United
States v. Robinson,55 demonstrate this proposi-
tion. White involved the "automobile excep-
tion," which had been recognized over the
years56 and which had recently been reaf-
firmed in Chambers v. Maroney. 7 The rationale
for the exception lies in the exigencies associ-
ated with mobility. 8 Under this doctrine police
officers without a warrant can search a vehicle
which has been stopped in transit if they have
probable cause to believe that the vehicle con-
tains contraband or evidence of a crime. The
search can be made at the scene of the stop or
delayed until the car has been transported to
the police station or to some other convenient
place.5 9 If it had not done so earlier, in Texas v.
White the United States Supreme Court made
it clear that the reasonableness of an automo-
bile search does not depend upon an assess-
ment of all the surrounding circumstances.
Even in situations where the rationale for the
automobile exception is absent, namely exigen-
cies associated with mobility, according to White
a search under the exception is still proper.60
All other factors are irrelevant once two ele-
ments are present: (1) a vehicle stopped in
transit; and (2) search probable cause. After
White we must assume that a warrantless search
of a vehicle is permissible upon search probable
cause even if the car is stopped just outside a
building which houses both a police station
and a court, even if the sole occupant of the
vehicle is arrested, and even if a magistrate is
53 Id.
'a 423 U.S. 67 (1975).
414 U.S. 218 (1973).
56 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
5 399 U.S. 42 (1973).
18 Id. at 48-51.
11 Id. at 47-52.
0 423 U.S. at 68.
available immediately to consider an applica-
tion for a search warrant.
61
The Supreme Court in United States v. Robin-
son62 afforded similar treatment to the doctrine
of search incident to arrest, creating another
rule of per se reasonableness. The rationale
for the search-incident exception rests upon
the need to prevent the arrestee from securing
a weapon or destroying evidence of the crime.
Yet in Robinson the Court indicated that where
the circumstances surrounding an arrest dem-
onstrate no need to search the arrestee for
either purpose, a search incident to arrest is
still constitutionally proper. After Robinson we
must assume that the Court would uphold the
search of a rabbi-a pillar of the community-
following a minor traffic arrest although a
thorough frisk of the rabbi's person had yielded
no weapon and although the crime was not of
the type which is evidenced by any object which
can be concealed on the person. Only a single
element-a valid custodial arrest-is necessary
to justify a contemporaneous warrantless
search of the arrestee's person. All other sur-
rounding circumstances are irrelevant to the
fourth amendment determination of reasona-
bleness.
As Edwards, Murphy, White, and Robinson in-
dicate, the Court has inverted its pledge in
Katz to invalidate, per se, all warrantless
searches falling outside the traditional excep-
tions. While not adhering to the per se rule of
unreasonableness, it has created rules of per se
reasonableness. No doubt it has done the latter
to serve two kinds of administrative conveni-
ence, police and judicial. Under Texas v. White,
an officer need not weigh the exigencies 6f
each situation to determine whether without a
warrant he can search a vehicle stopped on the
highway. Nor need an officer, following a valid
arrest, make an individual calculation about
the possibility that a full search will yield either
a weapon or evidence of the crime. Per se
rules somewhat simplify the task of the law
enforcement officer. Similarly, trial and re-
viewing courts need not be bogged down by
the necessity for making individual determina-
tions of reasonableness .63
61 These, of course, were not the facts of the case,
but under the decision's rationale, the warrantless
intrusion would have been upheld if these had been
the facts.
414 U.S. 218 (1973).
63 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976),
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Of course, the well-delineated exception ap-
proach described in Katz, if adhered to, would
also be simpler to administer than an approach
which permits law enforcement to point to all
the circumstances of a search in defending
against a fourth amendment claim. Thus, it
may be difficult to defend the logic of a system
in which per se rules are conclusive only where
they favor the prosecution. Without insisting
that such a defense is impossible, 4 the author
merely repeats his conclusion: by creating a
system in which law enforcement, but not the
citizenry, can rely upon per se rules, the Su-
preme Court has departed in a most funda-
mental way from its assertion that searches
outside the judicial process are per se unrea-
also created a rule of per se reasonableness. There
the Court held that without regard to the surround-
ing circumstances (e.g., the presence or absence of
facts demonstrating the need for swift action), upon
probable cause without a warrant an officer can
arrest a suspected felon in a public place. I have not
treated this case in the text because it involves a
warrantless seizure rather than a warrantless search.
See note 8 supra. One dissenter in Watson argued
that the majority's rationale would also lead the Court
to create a per se rule of reasonableness for warrant-
less entries into homes for purpose of arrest. Id. at
453-54 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Such a per se rule
now exists in Illinois. See People v. Johnson, 45 Il1.
2d 283, 259 N.E.2d 57 (1970), cert. denied, 407 U.S.
914 (1972).
1 If at trial the police are given an opportunity to
argue that their conduct was reasonable even though
it did not fit within any of the recognized exceptions,
ordinarily this will pose no problem for citizens in
deciding how they should act. If at trial the citizen
has an opportunity to argue that the officer's conduct
was unreasonable even though it fit within a recog-
nized exception, officers will suffer uncertainty as to
how they should conduct themselves. Thus because
police officers have a greater need for fourth amend-
ment certainty than do citizens, because officers'
conduct varies with the rule of law, it could be
argued that per se rules of reasonableness are more
justified than per se rules of unreasonableness. Ide-
ally, we should always consider all the circumstances
in determining reasonableness, but the need for
simplicity points to the use of per se rules of reason-
ableness more strongly than it does to the use of per
se rules of unreasonableness.
Whether this justification is sound or not, it is
certain that one who lectures prosecutors can urge
them to argue the narrow rule, if a search fits within
the rule, and the broad concept of reasonableness if
the search does not fit within the rule. Because of
the inversion of the per se rule of Katz, a lecturer
can suggest no analogous approach to defense law.
yers.
sonable, subject only to a few specially estab-
lished, well-delineated exceptions.
II. CLAIMS OF SHAM
Criminal defense attorneys frequently allege
potential or actual police abuse of various ex-
ceptions to the search warrant requirement.
They complain, for instance, of police efforts
to discover criminal evidence through tiffied
arrests,65 pretext license inspections, " and
sham inventory searches.6 7 Lower courts often
have responded by examining the officer's mo-
tivation on a case-by-case basis, and by exclud-
ing evidence when the officer's true purpose
has been deemed bad.68 The United States
Supreme Court on several occasions has re-
acted to claims of sham by narrowing a war-
rantless intrusion doctrine, so as to limit the
possibility of abuse. 69 In other instances, with-
out modifying the doctrine, the Court has held
out the possibility that it, too, would use the
"bad motivation" approach in individual
cases. 70 On the other hand, Professor Anthony
Amsterdam and other well respected fourth
amendment experts have recommended an ap-
proach which I call "use-exclusion. ' 71 In the
65 United States v. Carriger, 541 F.2d 545 (6th Cir.
1976); United States v. Bradley, 455 F.2d 1181 (1st
Cir. 1972), affd, 410 U.S. 605 (1973); People v. Rind,
57 Misc. 2d 349, 292 N.Y.S.2d 769 (1968).
11 Swift v. State, 131 Ga. App. 231, 206 S.E.2d 51,
rev'd. 232 Ga. 535, 207 S.E.2d 459 (1974); State v.
Maynard, 114 N.H. 525, 323 A.2d 580 (1974); People
v. Lilly, 88 Ill. App. 3d 379, 347 N.E.2d 842 (1976).
67 People v. Martin, 48 App. Div. 2d 213, 368
N.Y.S.2d 342 (1975); State v. Boster, 217 Kan. 618,
539 P.2d 294 (1975).
1 See, e.g., United States v. Edmons, 432 F.2d 577
(2d Cir. 1970); People v. Martin, 48 App. Div. 2d
213, 368 N.Y.S.2d 342 (1975); Swift v. State, 131 Ga.
App. 231, 206 S.E.2d 51, rev'd, 207 S.E.2d 459 (1974);
State v. Cooley, 229 N.W.2d 755 (Ia. 1975); Brumley
v. State, 484 P.2d 554 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); O'Neil
v. State, 194 So. 2d 40 (Fla. App. 1967); People v
Nagel, 4 Cal. App. 3d.458, 84 Cal. Rptr. 353 (1970);
People v. Rind, 57 Misc. 2d 349, 292 N.Y.S.2d 769
(1968); People v. Harr, 93 Ill. App. 2d 146, 235
N.E.2d 1 (1968); People v. Lilly, 38 Ill. App. 3d 379,
347 N.E.2d 842 (1976).
69 See text accompanying notes 109-10 infra.
70 See text accompanying notes 92-93 infra.
71 Amsterdam, supra note 6, at 433-39; LaFave,
"Case by Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Proce-
dures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SUPREME COURT
REV. 127, 156-57 [hereinafter referred to as LaFave].
Amsterdam's advocacy of use-exclusion is much more
encompassing than LaFave's suggestion that it be
used to govern searches incident to traffic arrests;
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material which follows, after defining the prob-
lem, I describe and evaluate the different types
of responses to claims of sham. I conclude that
the use-exclusion approach is the least desirable
method of dealing with this fourth amendment
problem.
Defining the Problem
While adhering to the letter of a judicially-
approved doctrine- such as search incident to
arrest, stop-and-frisk, or inventory search-a
police officer might use the authorized power
for a purpose not intended by the court which
originally sanctioned use of such power. For
instance, the United States Supreme Court
approved the Terry frisk in order to protect
officers from the possible use of concealed
weapons during lawful on-the-street question-
ing;72 yet some officers, while staying within
Terry boundaries, may employ stop-and-frisk
procedures where their true motivation is the
hope of discovering narcotics. Similarly, courts
have sanctioned inventory searches in order to
safeguard the property of citizens and to deter
false claims of theft;73 yet some officers may
use an inventory search in quest of criminal
evidence in cases where they have not, and
perhaps, for want of probable cause, could not
secure a search warrant. After relating several
examples, Professor Amsterdam summarized
the concern nicely:
First. A powr is claimed by a law enforcement
officer to engage in conduct that intrudes upon
the privacy of a citizen .... Second. The allowance
of that power consistently with the fourth
amendment is sought to be justified by the exis-
tence of a specific law enforcement need....
Third. The power may in fact be exercised for
some other purpose than the one which is as-
serted to justify it. 4
Although some courts would be troubled by
the use of a judicially-approved doctrine for
any improper purpose, in criminal cases de-
fense counsel focus almost exclusively upon a
nevertheless, even Amsterdam's endorsement of the
approach is limited to select situations. See text
accompanying notes 88-91 infra.
72 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23-27 (1968).
• South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369
(1976); People v. Smith, 44 Ill.2d 82, 88, 254 N.E.2d
492, 496 (1969); State v. Hock, 54 NJ, 526, 534-35,
257 A.2d 699, 703 (1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 930
(1970).
74 Amsterdam,supra note 6, at 434.
single type of "bad" motivation: an officer's
desire to discover criminal evidence.7 5 In other
words, claims of sham echo through the crimi-
nal court building only where the officer is
pursuing what is normally considered a legiti-
mate law enforcement objective. If Officer A,
following a minor traffic violation, stops the
offender in hope of spotting contraband in
plain view, defense counsel will probably argue
that the officer's motivation is reason enough
to suppress any evidence discovered after the
stop. If Officer B made a traffic stop because
the offending driver was an attractive female,
defense counsel probably will make no motion
to suppress evidence found in plain view based
upon the officer's improper motivation. Thus
our sole concern is the use of fourth amend-
ment doctrines as a guise for discovering crim-
inal evidence where those doctrines were not
approved for such purpose.
Keep in mind also that we are discussing
pretext, not perjury. There is a difference
between a "sham" and a "lie." In deciding
whether to approve the use of stop-and-frisk
procedures or ordinary traffic stops, a court
may consider the possibility that an officer who
is willing to fabricate data to justify such stops
would be able to use judicially-approved doc-
trines as a means of discovering criminal evi-
dence without a search warrant. But this is a
different problem. For now we are concerned
about cases where the officer is conforming to
the letter of the law-where there are, for
instance, judicially-approved grounds for a
stop-but where the officer's motivation is al-
leged to be improper.
Alternative Responses to Claims of Sham
Again borrowing from Professor Amster-
dam, we can classify various possible judicial
responses to claims of sham .7 A court can
15 Occasionally a civil suit is brought to challenge a
different type of bad motivation in the use of fourth
amendment powers, namely, racially discriminatory
motivation.
7c Amsterdam, supra note 6, at 436-39. As does
Amsterdam, I omit discussion of the "administrative-
regulations" approach as a possible solution to the
problem under discussion. Like Amsterdam, I be-
lieve that the administrative-regulations approach
must be evaluated on broader criteria than its ability
to end sham use of fourth amendment powers. The
police-regulations concept by now has a lengthy his-
tory. See R. Fincher, Implementation of Administra-
tive Rulemaking in the San Jose Police Department
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react in one of several ways after assessing
potential or actual abuses of a particular fourth
amendment doctrine. (1) It can uphold use of
power under the doctrine but exclude from a
criminal trial all evidence discovered where
such discovery was not within the dotrine's
"reason for being." (2) It can uphold the doc-
trine but exclude from a criminal trial any
evidence discovered where such discovery was
not within the doctrine's "reason for being" if
the possibility for such discovery motivated the
officer's use of authority under the doctrine.
(3) The court can uphold the doctrine and
admit all evidence discovered as long as the
officer, whatever his motivation, obeyed the
letter of the law. (4) It can eliminate the doc-
trine or narrow its application so as to reduce
the possibility of sham.
As I indicate below, I believe that, in reacting
to claims of sham, courts generally should make
the "hard choice" between the third and the
fourth approaches. My greatest concern, how-
ever, is that courts should not use the first
method, which I call "use-exclusion."
1. The Use-Exclusion Approach
Before pondering a definition, consider the
use-exclusion method as applied in inventory-
search and stop-and-frisk cases. Government
officials could engage in inventory searches as
heretofore approved. Because the rationale for
the inventory search exception to the warrant
requirement is not the possible discovery of
12-18 (1975) (unpublished thesis in Northwestern
University School of Law Library). The idea should
now be judged according to its practicability, both as
to drafting and implementation. For a list of various
projects designed to make the concept a reality, see
id. at 19-25. Further discussion without empirical
data would not be very helpful.
For purposes of our present discussion, the admin-
istrative-law approach is somewhat like the third
method discussed in this section, in that it would
narrow search and seizure powers but then would
allow admission of evidence discovered through the
use of the power, without regard to police motiva-
tion. To the extent that the administrative-law ap-
proach eliminates discretion, it eliminates the offi-
cer's ability to use a particular power because of
some individual motivation. Of course, the elimina-
tion of discretion also makes certain searches man-
datory. Unless I were trying to get the citizenry to
rise up and demand restrictions on police powers, I
would not favor a rule which, for instance, required
officers to make full searches of all traffic arrestees.
The cure of mandatory searches is worse than the ill
of improperly motivated searches.
criminal evidence, however, the prosecution
could not introduce at trial any evidence discov-
ered in an inventory search. Nor could it use
as evidence anything derived from the search.
The motivation for any particular inventory
search would be irrelevant. This approach
would satisfy the alleged need to protect prop-
erty and to discourage false claims of theft. At
the same time it would deprive the police of
any motive to use an inventory search as a
guise for searching for criminal evidence. The
use-exclusion approach would also avoid the
troublesome search for an individual police
officer's true motivation.
Similarly, an officer would be permitted to
frisk suspects in accordance with the principles
of Terry v. Ohio.7 7 The rationale for upholding
the power to frisk is the need to discover if the
suspect is armed. Therefore, if a frisk con-
ducted within proper limits yielded some evi-
dence other than a weapon, the court would
not admit such evidence in a criminal trial.
The use-exclusion compromise would satisfy
the need to protect the officer, while making
fruitless any use of stop-and-frisk procedures
as guise for discovering narcotics or other crim-
inal evidence.
To state the matter abstractly, use-exclusion
would allow an officer to employ a particular
search-and-seizure doctrine free of judicial
scrutiny of his motive. His conduct would be
deemed reasonable under the fourth amend-
ment as long as he kept within the letter of the
law. Without regard to the officer's good faith
or bad faith, however, the prosecution could
not use any criminal evidence discovered
through the officer's exercise of authority, ex-
cept where the rationale for the doctrine was
the possibility that through the use of authority
under the doctrine such criminal evidence
might be discovered. In all other cases, the
admission of evidence discovered through use
of the power, and of anything derived from
such discovery, would violate the fourth
amendment.75 Stated more crudely, the officer
could "do it" but often the prosecutor could
not "use it." This approach has at least one
analogue in criminal procedure: decisions
which permit governmental employers to ques-
77 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
78 Amsterdam, supra note 6, at 437-39. One court
seemingly has endorsed the use-exclusion method.
See Mayfield v. United States, 276 A.2d 123 (D.C.
App. 1971).
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tion employees despite fifth amendment objec-
tions, but which prohibit prosecutors from us-
ing as evidence anything derived from such
interrogation.7 9 The common characteristic of
all use-exclusion approaches is the exclusion
from a criminal prosecution of evidence which
has been lawfully acquired.80
The argument for fourth amendment use-
exclusion can be stated simply. Such an ap-
proach is necessary to raise the general level of
police conduct to the standard of reasonable-
ness demanded by the fourth amendment.81
The exclusion of some lawfully acquired evi-
dence is the necessary price for such a result.
For example, even if Officer X, motivated only
by the proper purpose of protecting a citizen's
property, conducted an inventory search within
the letter of the law, we must exclude any
criminal evidence which she came upon during
the inventory-this to ensure that Officer Y
and Officer Z, and all of X's other brother and
sister officers, will not abuse the inventory-
search power by using it in quest of criminal
evidence. In short, as Professor LaFave has
summarized, use-exclusion "would appear to
be a long overdue recognition of a 'regulatory'
rather than an 'atomistic' view of the Fourth
Amendment."82
I believe, however, that fourth amendment
use-exclusion is neither theoretically sound nor
politically feasible. My opposition rests on sev-
eral grounds. First, the "costs" of such an ap-
proach, while depending upon chance, would
inevitably be so enormous as to be intolerable,
partly because of derivative evidence conse-
quences. Second, in departing from present
exclusionary philosophy by attenuating the re-
lationship between misconduct and exclusion,
the use-exclusion approach would breed disre-
spect for the judiciary and would not survive a
brief experimental life. Third, I am convinced
that use-exclusion is such a radical approach
that even a zealous advocate would employ the
7' See Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968).
80 Right or wrong, the author is consistent in his
dislike for use-exclusion in all areas of criminal pro-
cedure. See F. INBAU, J. THOMPSON, J. HADDAD, J.
ZAGEL & G. STARKMAN, CASES AND COMMENTS ON
CRIMINAL PPROCEDURE (1974), 1977 SUPPLEMENT 57-
58.
sI LaFave, supra note 71, at 156-57; Amsterdam,
supra note 6, at 437-38.
'2 LaFave, supra note 71, at 157. The wordsl"regu-
latory" and "atomistic" are borrowed from Amster-
dam, supra note 6, at 437-39.
method sparingly. Such an advocate would use
it only to combat sham use of those fourth
amendment powers which he would gladly see
eliminated altogether. He would not propose
use-exclusion to curb sham use of fourth
amendment doctrines which he believes are
legitimate on their face. Thus, like the rest of
us, he would be required to turn elsewhere for
a solution to the problem of fourth amendment
sham.
In whatever area it were utilized, the costs of
use-exclusion would depend upon chance.
Consider, for example, a rule which permitted
inventory searches but which excluded from a
criminal trial, without regard to the officer's
good faith, any evidence derived from an in-
ventory search. Many such inspections would
be free of charge to society, for they would
produce no criminal evidence. In some cases,
however, the inventory would result in the
discovery of marijuana; in others, officers
would discover the corpse of a homicide victim
or other evidence of a murder. Because noth-
ing found in the inventory could be used as
criminal evidence, the costs to society would
vary with the magnitude of the discovery.
Moreover, such exclusion would not merely
leave the police where they would have been if
they had not made the inventory search.
Rather, under normal derivative evidence prin-
ciples, which use-exclusion advocates may have
overlooked,83 chance discoveries could effec-
tively bar any prosecution. If, for instance, an
inventory search of a vehicle provided law
enforcement with the first link between the car
owner and a murder, no matter what evidence
emerged thereafter, very likely the prosecutor
would be unable to prove that his case had
origins entirely independent of the inventory
search. Unlike its fifth amendment analogue,
fourth amendment use-exclusion does not lend
8 Practically, use-exclusion advocates could not
eliminate derivative evidence consequences by ex-
cluding the "original" evidence but admitting its
"fruits." There really is no such thing as use-exclusion
without fruits-exclusion. One cannot very well ex-
clude a gun but permit testimony about discovery of
the gun. To the extent that one drew an arbitrary
line between use and fruits and admitted the latter,
to that same extent would officers be permitted to
benefit by using a fourth amendment power for an
improper purpose. Therefore, in patching up use-
exclusion by modifying derivative evidence princi-




itself to the institutionalization of procedures
which can safeguard a prosecution from taint.M
The officer who discovers evidence during an
inventory search of a vehicle can hardly be
expected to keep his knowledge from detectives
who are investigating a murder. If a" court
effectively mandated such secret-keeping (lest
the use-exclusion approach fatally taint a pros-
ecution), it would create enormous public out-
rage. Imagine, for instance, reaction to the
requirement that an officer keep secret his
discovery of a small child's body in an automo-
bile trunk. And even if a police officer testified
that he had kept from homicide detectives his
knowledge of a link between a car owner and a
murder which they were investigating, a trial
court's understandable skepticism might pre-
vent the prosecution from meeting its burden
of proving lack of taint.
The use-exclusion method would thus attach
an unknown but potentially enormous price to
the officer's decision to conduct an inventory
search, or to utilize any other fourth amend-
ment power not designed for the discovery of
criminal evidence. It would present law en-
forcement with difficult choices: frisk a suspect
at the risk of jeopardizing a burglary prosecu-
tion if the hard object turns out to be stolen
jewelry rather than a weapon; curb a vehicle
for a traffic offense at the risk of barring a
homicide prosecution if the stop leads to the
discovery of murder evidence in plain view
within the car; inventory an automobile at the
risk of immunizing its owner from criminal
prosecution. The choice is between two legiti-
mate objectives, protecting an officer's life or
enforcing the burglary statute; enforcing the
traffic code or prosecuting for murder; safe-
guarding the property of citizens or enforcing
the criminal code. The Constitution should not
and, as Justice Frankfurter said, in a related
context, the "Constitution does not require that
honest law enforcement should be put to an
unavoidable choice .between two recourses of
the Government."85
8 If, for instance, police officials compel answers
from an officer who is the subject of a departmental
excessive-force investigation, a prosecutor can de-
cline to examine the police internal file, at least until
he has completed his investigation and "sealed" his
evidence. Thus the prosecutor may have some chance
of demonstrating that his criminal case is untainted
by the officer's compelled answers in the internal
investigation.
85 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 229 (1960).
I also believe that the use-exclusion method's
"regulatory" approach to exclusionary princi-
ples is too subtle and too lacking in emotional
appeal to command widespread public orjudi-
cial support. At least some substantial segment
of the judiciary and of the public, even if they
cannot establish it empirically, feel a need to
deprive the prosecution of evidence in case M
if such evidence has been discovered through a
violation of the defendant's rights by an officer
who was investigating crime M. But once the
relationship between misconduct and exclusion
is attenuated-once, so as to serve some remote
purpose, we exclude evidence in a case where
the officers have done nothing wrong- we have
destroyed the tit-for-tat emotional base needed
to support exclusionary principles.
The point can be illustrated by a story which
never made the West reports and by discussion
of a common theme of a small series of re-
ported decisions. After he had killed eight
women, but before he was arrested, Richard
Speck's fourth amendment rights were violated
in connection with an "investigation" wholly
unrelated to the women's deaths. Acting on
the tip of a prostitute, relayed through several
hearsay sources, a police officer, without a
search warrant, entered a hotel room which
had been rented by Speck under an assumed
name and, in Speck's absence, confiscated a
gun.86 Later it appeared that this weapon prob-
ably had been the gun which Speck had used
to threaten the women as he tied their hands
behind their backs. Despite an abundance of
prosecutorial precaution to safeguard fourth
amendment rights in the investigation of the
eight slayings, the prosecution was deprived of
an important piece of evidence.8 7 To many
6 Record, C. 568-75, People v. Speck, 41 Ill. 2d
177, 242 N.E.2d 208 (1968). Having illegally seized
the weapon, the officer, perhaps to avoid paperwork
and court appearances, made no arrest and kept the
weapon rather than inventorying it.
8' The prosecution acknowledged the illegality of
the seizure and made no offer of the weapon. Re-
cord, C, 730. Despite the survivor's testimony about
a gun, the State's inability to introduce Speck's gun
has apparently contributed to the myth, spread in S.
BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN,
AND RAPE 361 (1975), that nine women (victims of
our culture, perhaps) bypassed an opportunity to
attack a lone man who was armed only with a knife.
Elsewhere in the Speck homicide investigation, prose-
cutors took such precautions as allowing Speck's one-
week tenancy of a certain boarding house room to
expire before searching it with the owner's consent,
although Speck had clearly abandoned the premises.
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persons such a result was intolerable. Because
the beat officer who had entered the room was
not a part of the homicide investigative team,
these persons felt that the Speck prosecution
should not have been the vehicle for punishing
the officer's misconduct. An "atomistic" view
of the fourth amendment, perhaps, but one
which must be reckoned with.
In what I call the "going-too-far" sequence
of opinions, the attenuation between wrong
and exclusion is much greater than in Speck,
but still not nearly as great as the attenuation
under the use-exclusion approach, A single
example illustrates these decisions." Let us
suppose that the police receive a tip that D was
the offender in a recent burglary. Unfortu-
nately, the informer is an unreliable one who
has not disclosed how he got his information.
Fortunately, D was arrested and fingerprinted
five years earlier, so that the police can com-
pare his prints to fingerprints found at the
scene. Unfortunately, the arrest five years ago
was illegal. If illegally obtained fingerprints led
to D's arrest, current exclusionary principles
would make his arrest unlawful and would
taint evidence immediately derived from that
arrest (perhaps including another fingerprint
card, a statement, an identification, and the
proceeds of the crime). Some courts, however,
have refused to apply the exclusionary rule in
such a case. Right or wrong, they have been
emotionally unable to penalize the prosecution
in this case for what an officer did in an unre-
lated matter years earlier. The relationship
between the misconduct and the exclusion of
evidence is too distant.
If the urge to limit application of the exclu-
sionary rule where there is attenuation between
misconduct and result is widespread-and I
suspect it is-it is impossible to envision broad
support for a rule which punishes police mis-
conduct in such an indirect fashion, namely
through the exclusion, under some circum-
stances, of evidence which has been lawfully
acquired. Accordingly, I do not believe that
the use-exclusion approach would survive its
initial strong test. The first time a judge was
called upon to effectively bar prosecution for
some notorious crime, in a case where an
officer in all good faith had conducted a rou-
11 See, e.g., United States v. Scios, (D.C. Cir. No.
75-1619 Aug. 23, 1976); Taylor v. State, 547 P.2d 674
(Nev. 1976); Commonwealth v. Fredericks, 235
Pa, Super. 78, 430 A.2d 498 (1975).
tine inventory search, would also be the last
time that use-exclusion would be applied to
inventory searches.
Finally, it appears that advocates of use-ex-
clusion support this response to claims of sham
only when they believe that the doctrine under
which the initial intrusion is made should either
be abolished or significantly limited. Consider
the power to stop an automobile under two
distinct theories: (1) to initiate prosecution fol-
lowing observation of a minor traffic violation;
and (2) to make an inspection of the driver's
license even though no offense has been ob-
served. Either power could be abused; that is,
either power could be used as a pretext for
placing an officer in a position to observe plain-
view evidence which nay be within the car.
Courts must respond to claims of sham follow-
ing either type of stop. Yet we have not heard
advocacy of use-exclusion in traffic stop cases,
but only in license-inspection cases. Such selec-
tive advocacy appears uniform. Professor Am-
sterdam endorses tuse-exclusion in license-
check and stop-and-frisk cases, s° I respectfully
suggest, because he believes that the fourth
amendment balance wopld be better struck if
officers had neither the stop-and-fisk nor the
license-check power to intrude against a citi-
zen's liberty and privacy. If the threat of use-
exclusion led police to abandon license-checks
or stop-and-frisk procedures (or, I suspect,
inventory searches) lest officers provide citizens
with an "immunity bath" in random fashion,
Amsterdam would probably say, "So be it." I
suspect, however, that he does not endorse
use-exclusion following traffic stops because he
believes such stops serve a legitimate law en-
forcement purpose which outweighs the
driver's interest in liberty and privacy. Simi-
larly, Professor LaFave tentatively endorses
use-exclusion following searches incident to
routine traffic arrests only, I believe, because
he prefers that the police not have the powei
which was sanctioned in United States v, Robin-
son.
90
89 Amsterdam, supra note 6, at 434. Since Amster-
dam has not purported to list all instances where he
would utilize use-exclusion, my conclusions are ad-
mittedly speculative. I think, however, that his par-
enthetical speaks volumes about when he would ad-
vocate use-exclusion: "I would apply the exclusionary
rule as I have suggested to stop-and-frisk, and also
to other search-and-seizure practices-such as
driver's license checks, if they are to be permitted at all.
" Id. at 438 (emphasis added).
See generally LaFave, supra note 71.
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Utilization of use-exclusion to meet all claims
of sham would result in some major alterations
of fourth amendment doctrine which responsi-
ble critics of the present system would be un-
willing to accept. As the automobile stop ex-
amples indicate, use-exclusion, uniformly ap-
plied, would radically alter plain view doc-
trines. Plain view observations and evidence
seized in plain view would always be excluded
where an officer's right to be at his vantage
point depended upon some prior valid intru-
sion (such as entry-to-arrest or stop-to-ticket),
the rationale for which intrusion is not the
possibility of discovering criminal evidence. If
this result did not follow, then how, for in-
stance, could use-exclusion be a solution for
pretext license checks or pretext traffic stops?
Similarly, the use-exclusion approach, applied
unselectively, would greatly alter the doctrine
of search incident to arrest. The purpose of a
search incident to arrest is to prevent the arres-
tee from destroying evidence of this crime or
from securing a weapon. The rationale of
"search-incident" does not include the possible
discovery of evidence of an unrelated crime
through a warrantless search conducted with-
out probable cause to believe that such evidence
will be discovered. Thus, under the use-exclu-
sion doctrine, only a weapon or evidence of
this crime could be admitted. The cost of a
search incident to arrest would be creation of
an "immunity shield" for unrelated evidence
discovered in such a search and for any evi-
dence derived through such discovery. If this
result did not follow, how would the use-exclu-
sion doctrine discourage an officer from using
a lawful marijuana arrest as a pretext for
searching the arrestee's person in quest of
evidence of a murder? Use-exclusion is advo-
cated selectively because its proponents are not
willing to accept the major modifications which
would flow from uniform application.
From these observations two conclusions fol-
low. First, any disclaimers to the contrary, the
real concern of advocates who selectively pro-
pose use-exclusion is judicial recognition of a
particular fourth amendment doctrine, not the
potential or actual abuse of the doctrine. What
is wrong with license checks, in their view, is
not that an officer might use the power as a
guise to catch a criminal, but rather that, with
no such purpose in mind, he can use it against
any motorist. The solution then is to eliminate
or to narrow in scope the license-check power
(or the doctrine of inventory search or stop-
and-frisk procedures or the power to search
traffic arrestees). To this theme the article shall
return shortly. 91 Second, because advocates of
use-exclusion would. use this method only to
meet some claims of sham, and because even in
those situations it would lead to intolerable
results, we must turn to alternative methods of
responding to claims of sham.
2. The Ulterior Purpose or Bad Motive Approach
Under a second approach to meeting claims
of sham, courts would examine an officer's
predominant motivation for utilizing authority
under a particular fourth amendment doctrine.
If the doctrine's reason for being was not the
possible discovery of criminal evidence, and if
the court found that an officer had used that
power primarily motivated by a desire to dis-
cover evidence, it would exclude any evidence
discovered through the use of the power. Con-
sider, for example, the stop of a vehicle follow-
ing a minor traffic violation. If the court deter-
mined that the officer's true purpose was not
to initiate a traffic prosecution but, rather was
to discover "plain view" evidence, it would
suppress any such evidence as well as testimony
derived from observation of such evidence. In
Abel v. United States" and, to a lesser extent,
elsewhere,9 3 the United States Supreme Court
in dictum left open the possibility of using this
approach, although it has never actually ex-
cluded evidence because of an officer's ulterior
motive. Lower courts have used this apporach
on many occasions.94
The most frequent criticism of the motivation
approach is that ajudicial search for an officer's
true motive is often difficult.9" To use the
words of Justice Fortas, spoken in a slightly
different context, the quest may be "as elusive
as an attempt to capture last night's moon-
beam,' 9 6 at least absent the officer's judicial
confession of his true motive. There are, how-
9" See text following note 115 infra.
92 362 U.S. 217, 230 (1960).
" United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.1
(1973); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364
(1976).
' See decisions cited in note 68 supra.
" See Amsterdam, supra note 6, at 436-37.
96 Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 562
(1968) (Fortas, J., concurring). See also id. at 564-65
(White, J., dissenting).
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ever, in some cases objective factors which
demonstrate that the officer's true motive was
the discovery of criminal evidence. 97 The hom-
icide detective who in the midst of an investi-
gation arrests a suspect on a valid disorderly
conduct charge, searches the suspect, and then
interrogates him about the homicide has prob-
ably revealed his true motive. 98 So also has the
officer who, responding to a robbery in prog-
ress, stops a vehicle which has run a red light
near the scene of the reported robbery. Thus
in some clear cases, where we are sure that an
officer used a fourth amendment power as a
pretext to discover criminal evidence, we could
use the ulterior-purpose test.
There are, however, more significant prob-
lems with the motivation test. In the first place,
the use of "objective" criteria to gauge motive
(for example, the fact that the officer was
responding to a robbery in progress when he
made a traffic stop) would lead to an anomalous
result. Consider two hypotheticals. Officer A
observes a traffic offense. No objective facts
suggest to him that anything more serious is
involved. Officer B observes the same traffic
offense. She knows some additional facts which
suggest that the vehicle's driver has just com-
mitted a murder, but her data falls just short
of the reasonable suspicion necessary to stop
the car under Terry or Brignoni-Ponce.99 Under
the ulterior purpose approach, A's stop of the
vehicle will be upheld, but B's will perhaps be
condemned as a pretext. A similar result would
follow in an inventory search situation follow-
ing the removal of a vehicle from the scene of
an accident. The more data suggesting that a
search of the trunk will yield criminal evidence
(as long as the data does not provide probable
cause for a search under the Carroll-Chambers00
" Elsewhere in fourth amendment law, trial courts
have been required to explore the minds of police
officers. In some jurisdictions, after Jones v. United
States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958), a search which slightly
precedes an arrest can be deemed incident to arrest
only if the officer intended to arrest without regard
to whether the search proved fruitful. See People v.
Cox, 49 Ill. 2d 245, 274 N.E.2d 45 (1971), and State v.
Baker, 112 NJ. Super. 351, 271 A.2d 435 (1970),
both of which show that objective facts may demon-
strate what an officer was thinking when he decided
to utilize a fourth amendment power.
'sSee, e.g., People v. Clark, 8 111. App. 3d 700, 291
N.E.2d 33 (1972).
422 U.S. 873 (1975).100 See text accompanying notes 54-61 supra.
doctrine), the more likely will the search be
condemned as a pretext. Justice Brennan noted
the dubious wisdom of such results when in
disassociating himself from the individual mo-
tivation test in his Abel dissent, he wrote: "[I]t
would appear a strange test as to whether a
search which turns up criminal evidence is
unreasonable, that the search is the more justi-
fiable the less there was antecedent probable
cause."
101
This brings us to another shortcoming of the
ulterior-motivation test. If an officer has legal
grounds to stop two traffic offenders, one of
whom he suspects may have been involved in a
recent homicide and one of whom he has no
reason to suspect of anything serious, would
not most of us prefer that the officer follow his
suspicions and pursue what may be a serious
matter? As Justice Brennan has indicated in an
analogous situation, we expect zealous conduct
from officers. 02 We expect them to use their
judicially approved powers to achieve the legit-
imate law enforcement purpose of discovering
criminal evidence. As Mr. Justice Douglas
added in the same case, it makes no sense to
accuse an officer of "bad faith" under such
circumstances 103
As the ulterior motive test has been adminis-
tered, in Abel and in lower court decisions,
under my reading of the cases, at least, an
ulterior motive to discover criminal evidence
has been insufficient to merit exclusion of evi-
dence.' °4 Instead, courts have excluded evi-
dence only where, in addition to finding an
ulterior motive, the court concluded that offi-
cers have acted in "bad faith." This highly
subjective concept seems to be a function of at
least two variables. A judge who is troubled by
judicial recognition of a particular search and
seizure power is more likely to find that it was
exercised in bad faith than is a judge who
approves the doctrine. Phrased another way,
we will probably find more cases condemning
license stops as pretexts than we will find cases
condemning traffic stops as pretexts. 0 5 Sec-
101 362 U.S. at 253 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
02 Id. at 252.
"1 Id. at 245 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
" The generalizations which follow are based
upon my examination, over the years, of perhaps
75 to 100 decisions where claims of sham have been
raised, including those cited in notes 65-68 supra.
i05 For example, I know of no Illinois appellate
1977]
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ondly, "bad faith" is more likely to be found
where a judge is not greatly concerned by the
need to discover the type of criminal evidence
which the officer had in mind. Let a narcotics
detective enter a home ostensibly to execute a
traffic arrest warrant, and we may witness a
finding of sham.1 16 Let a homicide investigator
use the same means of entering a home, and
we probably will not witness the suppression of
the murder weapon found in plain view within
the home.
The fact that the ulterior-motive test is rarely
used in a pure form, but rather is diluted by a
subjective "bad faith" component, suggests that
many persons are unwilling to penalize zealous
law enforcement. Agreeing with Mr. Justice
Brennan that such conduct is readily under-
standable, they are unwilling to condemn offi-
cers who, while staying within the letter of a
judicially-approved doctrine, have used the
doctrine for a purpose not originally intended,
namely, the discovery of criminal evidence.
Rather than denouncing an officer who pur-
sues this legitimate objective through a means
judicially approved on some other rationale,
these persons would reexamine the doctrine
which makes the misuse possible."0 7 If they
conclude that use for an improper purpose is
both likely and intolerable, they would elimi-
nate or narrow the doctrine which makes the
abuse possible. In short, they would pursue
the familiar practice of reforming a law which
is subject to use for the "wrong" purpose rather
than reacting to misuse on a case-by-case basis.
3. The "Hard Choice" Approach
Under a third method of meeting claims of
sham, a court reevaluates the search and sei-
opinion in which a stop following an actual traffic
violation has led to the suppression of evidence under
a pretext theory. The same cannot be said of license-
inspection stops. See, e.g. People v. Harr, 93 Ill.
App. 2d 146, 235 N.E.2d 1 (1968); People v. Lilly, 38
Ill. App. 3d 379, 347 N.E.2d 842 (1976).
106 Harding v. State, 301 So. 2d 513 (Fla. App.
1974). More than any other decision, this case made
me ask myself what is wrong with an officer's using
an approved fourth amendment doctrine to achieve
a legitimate law enforcement objective, albeit not
one contemplated within the doctrine's rationale.
Contrast People v. McNamara, 33 Ill. App. 3d 216,
338 N.E.2d 202 (1975) (same facts but no discussion
of sham).
107 This was Brennan's approach in Abel. See 362
U.S. at 254 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
zure doctrine which law enforcement agents
allegedly have misused. The court once more
balances the societal need for tho particular
governmental power against the intrusions on
privacy and liberty which are occasioned by the
use of the doctrine. If it sees that a particular
power is rarely used except as a guise for discov-
ering evidence, then it is not very likely to be
impressed by the argument that the govern-
ment needs the power for some other purpose.
In weighing the citizen's interests, the court
includes in its calculation such intrusions under
the particular doctrine as may be motivated by
a purpose other than the one which originally
was used to gain judicial acceptance of the
doctrine. The court then either reaffirms the
doctrine, rejects the doctrine, or narrows its
scope.
Let us exemplify this approach as it would
be used by a court which is faced with the
claim that officers frequently make arrests for
minor violations as a pretext for possible dis-
covery, through a search incident to arrest, of
evidence of more serious crimes. After balanc-
ing societal interests against personal liberty
and privacy, and calculating whether serious
abuse is likely to be frequent, a court could
decide to leave present law unchanged. Alter-
natively, it could modify either the officer's
power to make custodial arrests for minor
offenses or modify an officer's power to search
incident to arrests for minor offenses. Thus,
for instance, for most traffic offenses the police
might be required to use a notice-to-appear
method of initiating prosecution.106 Or, for
instance, the scope of the search incident to a
traffic arrest might be limited to a Tery-type
frisk.
This approach-making a difficult choice
between reaffirming a fourth amendment doc-
trine or narrowing its scope-is the one which
the United States Supreme Court has used
most frequently in meeting claims of sham,
although admittedly where it has refused to
modify a doctrine, it has left open the possibil-
ity of utilizing the bad motivation approach on
a case-by-case basis. °9 In Chimel v. California,'10
for example, the Court was confronted by the
claim that arrests will be delayed until the
108 This possibility was left open in Gustafson v.
Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 267 (1973) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring). See also LaFave, supra note 71, at 158-61.
109 See text accompanying notes 92-93 supra.
110 395 U.S. 752, 767 (1969).
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suspect is at home, so as to allow officers to
make a warrantless search under the broad
search-incident authority which had been rec-
ognized in United States v. Rabinowitz.' The
Court reacted by restricting the permissible
scope of a search incident to arrest to the area
within the arrestee's reach. In so doing, the
Court eliminated part of an officer's motivation
to delay an arrest until the suspect is at home.
No doubt the possibility of sham was just one
factor in the Court's reassessment of the
proper societal-individual balance to be struck
vis-a-vis the doctrine of search incident to ar-
rest. Similarly in Coolidge v. New Hampshire,112 a
plurality of the Court, by adding an "inadvert-
ence" requirement to the plain view doctrine,
narrowed an officer's opportunity to use fourth
amendment power (for example, the power to
enter for purposes of arrest) as a pretext to
put the officer in a position where he could
make a plain view seizure.
On the other hand, in cases where the Court
has been confronted by claims of potential or
actual use of a fourth amendment power for
an improper purpose, the Court has reaf-
firmed, without modification, certain fourth
amendment doctrines: search incident to arrest
in Robinson" 3 and Gustafson'14 and inventory
search in South Dakota v. Opperman 1 5 The
Court concluded in both cases that societal
interests outweighed individual interests, even
taking into account the possible use of these
doctrines for a purpose not intended. Accord-
ingly, it refused to narrow the scope of either
doctrine.
Although I might prefer that the Court had
resolved the "hard choice" differently in both
Robinson-Gustafson and Opperman, I believe that
the Court used the correct approach in both
cases. If I am troubled by doctrines which
permit the police to arrest and search minor
1 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
12 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Concerning possible limita-
tions upon the inadvertency requirement, see generally
J. HADDAD, ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 10.25-
10.30 (111. Inst. for CLE, 1976). To the extent that
the inadvertency requirement may make warranless
plain view seizures permissible only if there was a
lack of antecedent probable cause, see id. at § 10.28
and State v. Davenport, 510 P.2d 78 (Alas. 1973), the
doctrine suffers from the same fault as does the bad
motivation approach. See text accompanying notes
99-101 supra.
I" United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
114 Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
11 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
traffic offenders, and which permit the police
to completely inspect any property which falls
into their lawful custody, it is not primarily
because I fear use of these doctrines as pretexts
in the hope of discovering criminal evidence.
It is rather because the powers on their face
are too broad. The Court has struck the balance
in both cases in a fashion which I think gives
too much weight to societal interests.
Realizing that the hard-choice method may
win out merely because it is the least undesira-
ble alternative, let me summarize my reasons
for favoring this approach to meeting claims of
sham:
1. Unlike the use-exclusion doctrine, the
suggested approach is consonant with the
prevailing rationale of the exclusionary
rule. It would not breed disrespect by
requiring the exclusion of lawfully ac-
quired evidence.
2. Unlike use-exclusion, the hard-choice
approach does not make law enforcement
choose between exercising a legitimate
power and possibly fatally tainting, 6n a
random basis, an otherwise proper crimi-
nal prosecution.
3. As distinguished from the ulterior-
purpose test, the rule is easy to administer.
Courts decide what police conduct is per-
missible and find a fourth amendment
violation only when officers violate the
letter of the law. A judge need engage in
no exploration of an officer's motive.
4. Unlike the ulterior-purpose test, the
hard-choice approach does not penalize an
officer for using a judicially-sanctioned
power to achieve a legitimate law enforce-
ment objective: namely, the discovery of
criminal evidence. Why should we hail as
an effective advocate the lawyer who uses
to his client's advantage a law which was
intended for some other purpose, while
pointing the finger of shame at an officer
who has used search-and-seizure powers
to best advantage without violating the
letter of the law?
5. The true concern of proponents of
both the use-exclusion approach (as selec-
tively advocated) and the ulterior-purpose
test (as administered so as to exclude evi-
dence only when bad faith is found), is the
existence of certain governmental powers-
and not their abuse by officers who are
seeking criminal evidence. This focus is
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entirely proper. The hard-choice method
is the only approach which places the em-
phasis where it should be.
Before concluding, let me respond to a pos-
sible criticism of the hard-choice approach.
Some would say that once a doctrine' is re-
evaluated and the balance struck, either as
before or in a manner more favorable to indi-
vidual liberty and privacy, some use of the
doctrine for an unintended purpose will still
occur. If, for instance, police remain free to
stop traffic offenders, as presumably they will,
pretext traffic stops will occur. The hard-choice
approach seems to say, "So be it. That is the
price society must pay for enforcing the traffic
code." I would respond by observing that this
result does not trouble me greatly. If the power
to curb a driver who has committed a traffic
offense is tolerable-and recall we are discuss-
ing cases where such an offense actually has
occurred-then the officer's decision to use the
power because he thinks something more seri-
ous may be involved is also tolerable.
Finally, to those who find my reasoning
faulty and my conclusions untenable, let me
address a word in mitigation of my case by
returning to my opening remarks. My position
is understandable, if not defensible, when
viewed as a result of the process of lecturing
police officers. After urging officers to learn
the scope and limits of their fourth amendment
powers, one feels awkward admonishing them,
as I did for years, not to use their judicially-
approved powers so as to maximize the legiti-
mate law enforcement objective of discovering
criminal evidence. Eventually my schizophrenic
exhortations began to echo in my ears like
some mock-Spenserian refrain: "Be wise, be
wise, be very wise. But be not too wise." Little
wonder I came to favor an approach which
would narrow police power, but then would
allow that power to be exercised, within the
letter of the law, to maximize legitimate law
enforcement objectives, including the discovery
of criminal evidence.
III. FOURFOLD PROBABLE CAUSE
Having criticized the "well-delineated excep-
tion" proposition in Part I and the use-exclu-
sion proposal in Part II, the author hopes to
provide an affirmative contribution to fourth
amendment analysis in the concluding segment
of this article. My thesis is that there exist four
different kinds of probable cause: "crime," "of-
fender," "search" and "seizure."1 1 6 Various the-
ories under which fourth amendent intrusions
are permitted should be analyzed not only
according to the quantum but also the type of
probable cause which each theory requires. A
fourfold probable cause analysis can prevent
doctrinal confusion, provide a partial checklist
for evaluating the validity of a search or a
seizure, aid our understanding of the issues in
some major Supreme Court cases, and suggest
some unresolved questions which often are
overlooked. On the other hand, the fourfold
probable cause concept, like any schematic de-
vice which is offered to aid analysis, has its
limitations. By no Procrustean trick can every
fourth amendment issue be made to fit some-
where within this scheme. Nor is the concept
an end in itself. Its utility is exhausted at the
point where it no longer aids an individual's
own thinking about fourth amendment prob-
lems.
That caveat set forth, let me define my terms
and then apply the concept to some theories
under which searches and seizures are permit-
ted, at the same time dissecting some current
fourth amendment issues with the aid of the
fourfold probable cause analysis.
Definition of Terms
Crime probable cause ordinarily refers to the
probability that a criminal offense has been or
is being committed. Absent such a probability,
an arrest, with or without a warrant, is
invalid.11 7 On the other hand, whether there
exists a probability that a crime has been or is
being committed is entirely irrelevant to the
validity of a search under a theory of consent.s
Offender probable cause refers to the probabil-
ity that a particular person has committed or is
committing a criminal offense. It is necessary
for an arrest, with or without a warrant.
1 1 9
Offender probable cause is not required for
116 This concept originated in a discussion between
Attorney James B. Zagel and myself amidst prepara-
tion of our materials for the 1975 Northwestern
University Short Course for Prosecuting Attorneys.
See note 3 supra. The analysis can be viewed as an
effort to answer the question "Probable cause as to
what?" which Professor LaFave asked at the Short
Course for Criminal Defense Attorneys in the mid-
1960's. See also LaFave, Search and Seizure: "The
Course of True Law . . .Has Not .. .Run Smooth,"
1966 U. ILL. L. F. 255, 260-262.
117 See text accompanying notes 127-28 infra.
118 See text accompanying notes 165-67 infra.
119 See text accompanying notes 127-28 infra.
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the issuance of a search warrant, that is, H's
home can be searched under a warrant without
any probability that H committed a crime, as
long as other search warrant requirements have
been met.12
0
Search probable cause refers to the probability
that a search will prove fruitful. In some con-
texts it is essential, such as the "moving vehicle"
exception to the warrant requirement, where
search probable cause refers to the probability
that evidence of a crime will be discovered,
121
or in the stop-and-frisk context, where the
requirement refers to the probability that a
frisk will yield a weapon. 122 On the other hand,
search probable cause is not essential to intru-
sions under some other fourth amendment
theories. For instance, an officer's right to
search incident to arrest does not depend upon
the probability that the search will produce
either criminal evidence or a weapon. 123
Seizure probable cause refers to the probability
that an item which is to be taken and carried
away either is contraband or otherwise consti-
tutes evidence of a crime."2 It is necessary for
the seizure of property which has been ob-
served in plain view. 125 It is not essential to the
seizure of property under the inventory search
doctrine. 12
6
Keeping these definitions in mind, let us
now review some theories under which fourth
amendment intrusions are permitted.
A. Seizure Under Search Incident to Arrest
To seize an object under the doctrine of
search incident to arrest, an officer needs prob-
able cause to believe that a crime has been or is
being committed (crime probable cause) and
probable cause to believe that the person
searched has committed the crime (offender
probable cause). He does not need probable
cause to believe that the search will prove
fruitful (search probable cause). It is an open
and often overlooked question whether to take
and carry away the arrestee's property on a
120 See text accompanying notes 158-62 infra.
12! See text accompanying notes 168-76 infra.
'22 See text accompanying note 131 infra.
in See text accompanying notes 129-31 infra.
124 "Seizure" probable cause is least familiar. Per-
haps the earliest United States Supreme Court discus-
sion of this requirement came in Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557, 571 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring). See
also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466-
67 (1971).
12' See text accompanying notes 135-41 infra.
126 See text accompanying notes 190-92 infra.
search-incident theory the officer needs proba-
ble cause to believe that the property is contra-
band or evidence of a crime (seizure probable
cause).
In discussing the probable cause which is
necessary for a constitutionally valid arrest, we
often telescope the separate requirements of
crime probable cause and offender probable
cause by saying that a lawful arrest of D re-
quires probable cause to believe that D has
committed an offense. This combination of
two different concepts blurs a distinction which
some writers believe existed at common law
and which at one time was reflected in the law
of some American jurisdictions.1 27 Under this
view, probable cause to believe that a crime
had been committed and thatD had committed
it did not suffice to validate a warranless arrest
in a situation where, in fact, no crime had
been committed. If there was no crime, the
arrest was illegal no matter how reasonable the
officer's conclusion that a crime had been com-
mitted. On the other hand, at common law, as
now, if a crime had been committed but the
officer's reasonable conclusion that D had com-
mitted it proved erroneous, D's warrantless
arrest would still be considered lawful. Thus,
under this view, a lawful warrantless arrest
necessitated something more than crime prob-
able cause to be coupled with offender probable
cause. Today, however, crime probable cause
and offender probable cause suffice to validate
an arrest.
12
A recent dispute arose from the claim that
the doctrine of search incident to arrest re-
quires search probable cause. In United States
v. Robinson,129 the defendant asserted that the
127 Compare Hall, Legal and Social Aspects of Arrest
Without a Warrant, 49 HARV. L. REV. 566, 568-78
(1936), with R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 870 n.7
(1957). Until January 1, 1964, Illinois statutes re-
quired that a felony actually have been committed
for a warrantless felony arrest to be valid. See ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 657 (1961). See also Alvarez v.
Reynolds, 35 Ill. App. 2d 54, 181 N.E.2d 616 (1962);
McKendree v. Christy, 29 Ill. App. 2d 195, 172
N.E.2d 380 (1961). But see Aspen, Arrest and Arrest
Alternatives: Recent Trends, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 241, 244
& n.20.
128 Illinois, for instance, ended the distinction
when it adopted its 1963 Code of Criminal Proce-
dures. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 107-2(c) (1975).
The present author knows of no twentieth century
fourth amendent United States Supreme Court opin-
ion in which the distinction is reflected.




officers had no right to search his person
incident to arrest without having data establish-
ing some probability that the search would
yield criminal evidence or a weapon. 30 The
prosecution countered by asserting that a valid
custodial arrest automatically justifies a search
incident to arrest. The United States Supreme
Court agreed with the prosecution's position
and held that the officer is not required to
engage in an estimation that the search will
prove fruitful before he makes a full search
incident to arrest. In other words, search prob-
able cause is not required for a search incident
to arrest.
Despite the Court's holding in Robinson,
questions asked by both the prosecution and
the defense at hearings on motions to suppress
are often directed at search probable cause. If
the prosecution's theory, or one of its theories,
is that the evidence was discovered within the
limited confines of a lawful stop-and-frisk, the
officer does need to demonstrate a certain
quantum of probability (reasonable suspicion)
that the frisk would yield a weapon (search
probable cause).131 On the other hand, if the
prosecution can establish the elements of a
valid arrest, including crime probable cause
and offender probable cause, inquiries directed
to the probability that the search would prove
fruitful are wholly irrelevant. The fourfold
probable cause analysis serves as a reminder,
particularly to prosecutors and judges, of the
different probable cause requirements of stop-
and-frisk and of search incident to arrest. The
analysis indicates that the court must be con-
cerned not only with the different amounts of
probable cause (reasonable suspicion versus full
probable cause) but also with the different
types of probable cause necessary under each
doctrine.
The unanswered probable cause question
posed by the doctrine of search incident to
arrest, and one which will probably remain
unexplored until defense attorneys pursue the
issue more vigorously than they have done in
the past, is whethei! under the doctrine of
search incident to arrest a police officer can
take and carry away the property of an arrestee
without probable cause to believe that it is
contraband or constitutes evidence of a crime.
10 Robinson's search probable cause argument
might be read so as to be limited to the minor traffic
offense context in which it arose.
131 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Phrased another way, is seizure probable cause
necessary to justify retention of property under
the doctrine of search incident to arrest? Con-
sider the following hypothetical:
Officer Baker lawfully arrests Cain in
Cain's apartment .for an attempted bur-
glary of a home alleged to have been
committed one hour earlier. Baker
searches Cain's person and finds a red
capsule containing an unknown substance.
He also opens and searches a drawer
within Cain's reach and finds another red
capsule. Baker also notes that lying within
Cain's reach is a pair of sneakers capable
of making a distinct mark upon dirt or
upon a wet surface. As he stands there,
Officer Baker has no probable cause to
believe that either the capsules or the
sneakers constitute evidence of either the
burglary or any other crime. Can he nev-
ertheless take and carry away the items
under the doctrine of search incident to
arrest?
Kremen v. United States,132 a cryptic 1957 per
curiam opinion, may be the only United States
Supreme Court case focusing upon the issue.
In Kremen, F.B.I. agents made lawful arrests in
a cabin and conducted a full search of the
cabin, as was permissible under the then-pre-
vailing principles of search incident to arrest.
The agents seized and carried to their office
two hundred miles away the entire contents of
the cabin. They took literally hundreds of
items, including lipstick, eight bath towels, a
recording of Mendelssohn's Violin Concerto,
and a ping pong net with two holders. Without
citation of authority, and without providing
any analysis, the United States Supreme Court
invalidated the seizure. It remained for Justice
Harlan, a dozen years later, to provide a ration-
ale for the Court's decision: "Kremen simply
prohibits the police from seizing the entire
cofntents of a building, without considering
whether the property they take is relevant to
the crime under investigation; it does not bar
the removal of all property that may reasonably
be considered evidence of a crime.'
33
Under Harlan's formulation, even under a
search incident to arrest theory, to seize an
item the police must have at least some reason
to believe that it constitutes evidence of a crime.
132 353 U.S. 346 (1957).
"' Van Cleef v. New Jersey, 395 U.S. 814, 817
(1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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It is not clear, however, whether the required
degree of probability is "possible relevance,"
"reasonable suspicion" or "probable cause."
Nor is it clear whether the necessary degree of
probability is less where the evidence relates to
the crime for which the arrest has been made.
In our hypothetical, for instance, the sneakers
could perhaps be probative of the crime of
attempted burglary; but the capsules have no
apparent evidentiary value to that charge. The
law might allow the seizure of the capsules
only if there is probable cause to believe that
they are contraband but permit seizure of the
sneakers under some lesser standard of proba-
bility. From a doctrinal point of view, then, the
concept of seizure probable cause raises impor-
tant questions which have not yet been an-
swered in the context of a search incident to an
arrest.
In actual practice police officers fairly fre-
quently take and carry away an arrestee's prop-
erty with no more than a glimmer of hope that
further investigation or a crime laboratory
analysis will establish that the property is con-
traband or has evidentiary value. Even though
useful analogies, particularly in "plain view"
cases, are available to defense counsel, defense
lawyers often allow such speculative seizures of
the arrestee's property to go unchallenged.13 4
Absent a Supreme Court declaration that sei-
zure probable cause is unessential to a seizure
under a search incident to arrest, the defense
should pursue the issue when the facts make
plausible an argument based upon the absence
of seizure probable cause. Attention to the
concept of four distinct types of probable cause
will remind the defense of this argument.
B. Seizure Under Plain View Doctrine
Although it is impossible to generalize about
crime, offender, and search probable cause
requirements under the plain view exception
to the warrant requirement, seizure probable
cause is necessary for the police to take and
carry away property under a plain view theory.
'34 See text accompanying notes 135-41 infra for a
discussion of the plain view decisions. For an example
of a search incident to arrest decision where defense
counsel apparently failed to raise the seizure probable
cause issue, see People v. Hightower, 20 Ill. 2d 361,
169 N.E.2d 787 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 845
(1961). For a decision where the seizure probable
cause issue was successfully raised in a search incident
to arrest situation, see State v. Elkins, 245 Ore. 279
422 P.2d 250 (1966).
Subject to qualifications not relevant to our
discussion,13 1 the plain view doctrine permits a
police officer to seize contraband or criminal
evidence which he observes while standing in a
place where he has a right to be or while
looking into a place which he has a right to
search. His right to be in that place or his right
to search that place-a necessary prerequisite
to the invocation of the plain view doctrine-
may depend upon any one of a number of
theories. For instance, the officer may have
entered to make an arrest, or he may have.
been conducting a search under the authority
of a search warrant. Before deciding the valid-
ity of a plain view seizure, we must consider
what kinds and quanta of probable cause were
needed to justify the entry to arrest or the
issuance of the search warrant.
The common denominator of plain view sei-
zures is seizure probable cause. Even though
the United States Supreme Court has never
invalidated a plain view seizure for want of
seizure probable cause, and even though cases
from other courts appear to overlook the re-
quirement,'136 when defense counsel raises the
issue, reviewing courts today appear unani-
mous in the conclusion that an officer cannot,
under a plain view theory, seize and carry away
items without probable cause to believe that
the items are contraband or constitute evidence
of a crime.13 7 For example, if, while looking in
a place which they have a right to search under
a warrant which commands the seizure of her-
oin, officers discover bonds or securities, their
right to seize those commerical documents will
depend upon the presence of probable cause
to believe that the documents are stolen or in
some way are evidence of a crime.iss
131 1 refer to the reasonable expectation of privacy
qualification. See, e.g., People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d
884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973); Cohen
v. Superior Court, 5 Cal. App. 3d 429, 85 Cal. Rptr.
354 (1970). I also refer to the "inadvertency" limita-
tion. See note 113 supra and accompanying text.
136 See, e.g., People v. Myles, 2 Ill. App. 3d 955,
275 N.E.2d 691 (1971).
137 See, e.g., Christmas v. United States, 314 A.2d
473 (D.C. App. 1974); People v. Hermesch, 49 App.
Div. 2d 587, 370 N.Y.S.2d 152 (1975); People v.
Eastin, 8 Ill. App. 3d 512, 289 N.E.2d 673 (1972);
State v. Sagner, 12 Ore. App. 459, 506 P.2d 510
(1973); People v. White, 46 Mich. App. 195, 207
N.W.2d 921 (1973); Shipman v. State, 291 Ala. 484,
282 So. 2d 700 (1973).
138 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 280
N.E.2d 665 (Mass. 1972). See also Commonwealth v.
Wojcik, 358 Mass. 623,266 N.E.2d 645 (197 1). Compare
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Consider again the hypothetical discussed
above, this time placing the capsules and the
sneakers out of the reach of the arrestee but
within the plain sight of the arresting officer.
Because of spatial limitations adopted in Chimel
v. California,'3 9 the officer cannot seize the
items under a search incident to arrest theory.
The seizures are proper, if at all, only if the
plain view theory can properly be invoked.
This, in turn, will require an assessment of the
probability that the items are contraband or
have evidentiary value. Under the facts stated
in the hypothetical, there is no seizure probable
cause as to either the capsules or the sneakers.
Their seizure under a plain view theory would
be impermissible.
The issue which is most frequently disputed
as a result of the seizure probable cause re-
quirement under the plain view doctrine is
whether the police can closely examine "plain
view" items to determine whether there is sei-
zure probable cause. Can they check the serial
number of the bonds or the serial number of a
television set against a "hot sheet" which lists
stolen property? Can they pick up boots to
examine their soles for tell-tale evidence related
to a home invasion? Or does such conduct
itself amount to a forbidden warrantless
search? Although the "close look" cases reach
no unanimous result, they all implicitly ac-
knowledge the seizure probable cause require-
ment under the plain view doctrine. 4
The fourfold probable cause analysis, uti-
lized in plain view cases, reminds us that the
right to look is not the right to take. The right
to see is not the right to seize. Defense lawyers
should not forget to argue the lack of seizure
probable cause in appropriate plain view cases.
Nor should the prosecution forget its obligation
to elicit facts to establish that the items seized,
at the time of their taking, could reasonably be
thought to be contraband or evidence of a
Commonwealth v. DeMasi, 283 N.E.2d 845 (Mass.
1972).
39 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
140 "Close look" cases include United States v.
Clark, 531 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Gray, 484 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1158 (1974); Wilson v. State, 30 Md. App. 242,
351 A.2d 437 (1976); State v. Murray, 8 Wash. App.
944, 509 P.2d 1003, affd, 84 Wash. 2d 527, 527 P.2d
1303 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975). See also
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 571 (Stewart, J.,
concurring). Compare State v. Proctor, 12 Wash. App.
274, 529 P.2d 472 (1974).
crime.14 1 If a defense lawyer is alert, the prose-
cutor's proof that an item seized was in plain
view from a vantage point where the officer
had a right to be will be insufficient, without a
demonstration of seizure probable cause, to
uphold a-seizure un.der a plain view theory.
C. Search and Seizure of Abandoned Property
Even without crime, offender, search or sei-
zure probable cause, police officers can search
or seize abandoned property without being
guilty of a violation of the rights of the person
who abandoned the property. For fourth
amendment purposes at least, such a person is
no longer a claimant of the goods. 142 With no
danger of violating that person's constitutional
protections, the police can intrude against the
property without data demonstrating any par-
ticular degree or type of probability. The dis-
tinction should be kept in mind in the class of
cases where "abandonment" and "plain view"
may both be plausible theories for justifying a
seizure: the "drop" cases. Consider the follow-
ing hypothetical:
While sitting on a park bench in jurisdic-
tion X, Dore spots Officer Elwin walking
his beat. Dore casually places a cigarette
package on the bench about a foot from
his thigh. Elwin seizes the packet, inspects
it, and discovers heroin. Before he seized
it, Elwin had no probable cause to believe
that the cigarette package contained con-
traband or evidence of a crime. Injurisdic-
tion X, absent such probable cause, the
seizure cannot be upheld on a plain view
theory because under the case law of X,
inspection of Dore's property without
search probable cause would itself amount
to an unreasonable search. Can the seizure
nevertheless be upheld?
The answer depends upon whether the
property has been abandoned. Because an in-
141 In jurisdictions in which an inadvertency re-
quirement limits plain view seizures, see note 112
supra and accompanying text, the prosecution may
have to walk a narrow path. It will be required to
show that before they entered to arrest (or under
some other valid theory), the police did not have
search probable cause for a particular item, but that
they had seizure probable cause for that item before
they took it away.
142 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241 (1960).
See also Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960);
Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
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tent permanently to give up all claim to prop-
erty is usually considered an essential elemeit
of abandonment, not every case in which a
person places or drops property somewhere
allows the property to be seized on an abandon-
ment theory. If seizure probable cause is lack-
ing, and if the property has not been aban-
doned, then the police may not seize it even if
the property is in plain view. Many cases involv-
ing "dropped" evidence fail to articulate the
theory under which the seizure is justified.
Some seem to use "plain view" and "abandon-
ment" interchangably. 4 3 In those instances
where seizure probable cause arguably was
lacking, and where the conduct of the defend-
ant arguably did not amount to abandonment,
the fourfold probable cause analysis should
lead defense counsel to press the court to
distinguish between abandonment theory and
plain view theory. The distinction can lead to
the suppression of evidence which otherwise
might be admitted.
D. The Issuance of a Search Warrant for Criminal
Evidence
The issuance of a valid warrant commanding
the seizure of contraband or criminal evidence
requires information demonstrating a probabil-
ity that a crime has been committed (crime
probable cause). The information must also
establish a probability that the item named in
the warrant (a) constitutes evidence of that
crime and (b) presently is located at the place
to be searched. 144 In other words, a particular
type of search probable cause is required. The
issuance of a search warrant does not necessi-
tate offender probable cause. 145 Nor do ques-
'13 See, e.g.,People v. Brasfield, 28 Ill. 2d 518, 192
N.E.2d 914 (1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 980 (1964);
People v. Jackson, 98 Ill. App. 2d 238, 240 N.E.2d 421
(1968). For an automobile case which correctly sepa-
rates abandonment theory (with no seizure probable
cause requirement) from plain view theory (with the
seizure probable cause requirement), see People v.
Hermesch, 49 App. Div. 2d 587, 370 N.Y.S. 2d 152
(1975).
"' People v. Francisco, 44 Ill. 2d 373, 376, 255
N.E.2d 413, 415 (1970).
145 People v. Simmons, 330 Ill. 494, 161 N.E. 716
(1928); People v. Daugherty, 324 Ill. 160, 154 N.E.
907 (1926). For a recent example of a search warrant
which was issued without any reason to believe that
the property owner had committed the crime in
question, see People ex rel. Carey v. Covelli, 61 Ill. 2d
394, 336 N.E.2d 759 (1975). See also T. TAYLOR, supra
note 6, at 28.
tions of seizure probable cause arise at the time
of issuance.1
46
The discussion which follows treats two prac-
tical search warrant problems which appear
under a fourfold probable cause analysis. The
author, at a more theoretical level, then reflects
upon the absence of an offender probable
cause requirement for the issuance of search
warrants.
1. Circumstantial Evidence and Search Probable
Cause
Sometimes police officers or prosecutors re-
quest the issuance of search warrants without
claiming that direct evidence establishes the
probability that the item named for seizure is
at the place to be searched. In such cases
neither the affiant nor the affiant's source has
observed the contraband or the criminal evi-
dence in the specified place. Nevertheless, the
government agents urge that circumstantial ev-
idence demonstrates the required probability.
What type of circumstantial evidence will suf-
fice?
The typical dispute is whether a probability
that D has committed a crime (crine and of-
fender probable cause) is enough to impel the
inference that evidence of that crime is located
in his home, his car or his garage. If a woman
has sold narcotics on the street this morning, is
this sufficient, without other data, to justify
the search of her apartment this afternoon? If
a man committed a burglary last night, is this
sufficient to establish probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant for his garage this
afternoon?
Even a half century ago, defense lawyers
were arguing that the probability that their
clients had committed recent crimes did not,
by itself, establish probable cause to search
their property. 147 Nevertheless, the issue some-
times is overlooked and, when it is urged upon
a court, the results vary widely. Most courts
accept the search probable cause requirement
as an abstract concept. They recognize that
crime probable cause and offender probable
cause, by themselves, do not suffice to justify
the issuance of a warrant to search the sus-
146 At execution seizure probable cause issues may
arise if the officers seize an item not named in the
warrant. See text accompanying notes 136-37 supra.
147 See, e.g., People v. Billerbeck, 323 Ill. 48, 153




pected offender's property. Courts do, how-
ever, vary greatly in determining how much
more, besides crime and offender probable
cause, is required.
148
2. Staleness and Probable Cause
As Justice Marshall recently noted, crime
and offender probable cause do not grow
stale.1 49 Once the police have acquired probable
cause to believe that D has committed an of-
fense, the mere passage of time before they
arrest D creates no additional probable cause
problem. 50 Search probable cause, however,
does grow stale, and this creates difficulties in
search warrant cases. Even if an affiant has
personally observed heroin in a particular
apartment, the magistrate must be concerned
about whether the heroin is still likely to be
present at the time the search warrant is
sought.
The dimunition of search probable cause
with the passage of time has given rise to two
main classes of disputes. In the first, the affi-
davit does not expressly say when the relevant
information was observed.151 The affiant may
state that he purchased and used marijuana in
X's apartment and saw an additional quantity
there before he left; but if the affiant does not
say when he made these observations, the mag-
istrate cannot determine whether there is a
present probability that marijuana is at X's
apartment. Obviously, it makes a difference
whether the observations were made an hour
ago or a year ago. This error in draftsmanship
has occurred so frequently that a split in au-
141 See United States v. Bailey, 458 F.2d 408 (9th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Flanagan, 423 F.2d 745
(5th Cir. 1970); People v. Wright, 37 N.Y.2d 88, 332
N.E.2d 331 (1975); Commonwealth v. Kline, 234 Pa.
Super. 12, 335 A.2d 361 (1975); State v. Joseph (114
R.I. 596,337 A.2d 523 (1975). Compare United States v.
DiNovo, 523 F.2d 197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1016 (1975); United States v. Spach, 518 F.2d 866 (7th
Cir. 1975); United States v. Olt, 492 F.2d 910 (6th Cir.
1974). Often the issue is complicated by a passage of
time between the crime and the search.
149 423 U.S. 411, 449 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
"' Occasionally, however, new information point-
ing to the innocence of the suspect may destroy
previously established offender probable cause. Com-
pare United States v. Coughlin, 338 F. Supp. 1328
(E.D. Mich. 1972) with People v. Gwin, 49 Ill. 2d 255,
274 N.E.2d 43 (1971).
"' See, e.g., Dean v. State, 46 Ala. App. 365, 242
So. 2d 411 (1970); Bailey v. State, 131 Ga. App. 276,
.205 S.E.2d 532 (1974); State v. Oropeza, 97 Idaho
387, 545 P.2d 475 (1976).
thority had developed between courts which
strain to find that the affiant or hearsay source
"obviously" was referring to recent observa-
tions, and courts which refuse to cover for the
draftsman's mistake by giving a "present tense"
construction to the affidavit. 5 2
The second kind of case involves a more
substantive issue. Here the affiant states when
the last observations were made, and the issue
is whether that was too long ago. 53 The fre-
quency and the type of the criminal activity are
relevant to the search probable cause calcula-
tion, so that no fixed period can be described
as "permissible" or as "too long.""154 Sometimes
a passage of six days from the last observations
will destroy the requisite probable cause. 55
Sometimes three months will not.156 To say
that various factors must be weighed, however,
is not to say that the decisions can all be
reconciled. Some cases which find probable
cause to search an offender's property many
weeks after the last relevant observations seem
so implausible that one might conclude that
the judges have decided that it is proper to
invade a probable offender's privacy, under
the authority of a search warrant, even without
search probable cause. 57 To this subject, we
now turn our attention.
3. Reflections Upon Search Warrants and Offender
Probable Cause
The commentators and reviewing court
judges agree that under present law a warrant
can issue to search H's home or business with-
out any reason to believe that he has been a
party to criminal activity. 58 The warrant can
issue upon the demonstration that there is a
probable cause to believe that specified evi-
"' See State v. Richardson, 22 Ariz. App. 449, 528
P.2d 641 (1974); State v. Boudreaux, 304 So. 2d 343
(La. 1974). Compare authorities cited in note 151 supra.
1 See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 579
(1971); People v. Holmes, 20 I11. App. 3d 167, 312
N.E.2d 748 (1974); People v. Siemieniec, 368 Mich.
405, 118 N.W.2d 430 (1962); Wilson v. State, 47 Ind.
582, 333 N.E.2d 755 (1975); People v. Morrison, 13
Ill. App. 3d 652, 300 N.E.2d 325 (1973).
14 See generally LaFave, supra note 116, at 264-66.
"'See People v. Wright, 367 Mich. 611, 116 N.W.
2d 786 (1962).
156 See People v. Mason, 15 Il. App. 3d 404, 304
N.E.2d 466 (1973), where 107 days passed between
observation of the last datum and the issuance of a
warrant commanding the search of a home, garage,
and car and the seizure of several specified lost or
stolen credit cards and a lost or stolen drivers license.
"5 See especially id.
158 See note 44 supra.
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dence of a crime is presently located at H's
property. Professor LaFave is troubled by this
absence of an offender probable cause require-
ment. He has suggested that without a showing
that the criminal evidence could not otherwise
be discovered (as, for instance, through a sub-
poena), a search warrant should not issue for
H's property unless there is information linking
him to a crime.159 Surely the reasonableness
clause of the fourth amendent could be utilized
to achieve such a result. The case law recog-
nizes that sometimes it is not reasonable to
issue a search warrant even if the probable
cause requirement of the fourth amendment's
second clause is fully satisfied. For instance, a
warrant commanding the removal of a bullet
from someone's body may be unreasonable
under certain circumstances even if crime, of-
fender and search probable cause are present.16
Similarly, the present author would strongly
argue that crime and search probable cause
are not sufficient to justify a search even of a
suspect's home for the purpose of obtaining
handwriting exemplars when such exemplars
might readily be available elsewhere.' 61
There is, however, another way to view ab-
sence of an offender probable cause require-
ment in search warrant cases. If we feel that an
innocent person should have more privacy as
to his house or his car than a probable of-
fender, we may conclude that where offender
probable cause is present, we should be less
concerned about search probable cause. At
least where the police have probable cause to
arrest H and where they seek prior judicial
approval, why not allow something less than
traditional probable cause to suffice for the
issuance of a warrant to search H's property?
Where offender probable cause is present, rea-
sonable suspicion that criminal evidence would
be found should perhaps permit issuance of
the warrant. Although judicial opinons purport
to require "full" probable cause, in actual prac-
tice many seem to be satisfied with reasonable
suspicion where it is a probable offender whose
privacy is being invaded. 62
19 LaFave, supra note 71, at 159-60.
'6 See, e.g., Adams v. State, 260 Ind. 663, 299
N.E.2d 834 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974).
" Thus, exemplars may constitute a type of evi-
dence which is even lower on the list of "seizable"
materials than is "mere evidence." See J. HADDAD,
supra note 3, at § 16.25.
12 The generalization is based upon my reading
of decisions of the type cited in notes 153-57 supra.
Can such a dimunition of the search probable
cause requirement be defended without doing
violence to fourth amendment theory? Some
might argue that the amendment's warrant
clause is not as flexible as the reasonableness
clause. Reasonableness varies with the circum-
stances, but the term "probable cause," as used
in the warrant clause, cannot mean one thing
in one search warrant case and another in a
different search warrant case.
Camara v. Municipal Court'63 appears to pro-
vide a complete answer to the argument that
search warrant probable cause cannot vary with
the circumstances. In Camara, judicial warrants
permitting health inspections were permitted
to issue without a demonstration of either prob-
able cause to believe that a crime has been
committed or probable cause to believe that
criminal evidence would be found. If the Ca-
mara dissenters had prevailed, thus allowing
search warrants to issue only upon a showing
of traditional crime and search probable cause,
then the fourth amendment's warrant clause in
many cases would prevent striking a proper
balance between the rights of the citizen and
the needs of society. Courts could still sanction
searches which had received no prior judicial
approval, even on less than probable cause.
They could also require a showing of crime
and search probable cause for searches con-
ducted with prior judicial approval. However,
they would not be able, as a requirement of
reasonableness, to demand prior judicial ap-
proval in any instance where crime or search
probable cause was lacking. Thus, for instance,
they would not be permitted to uphold a war-
rant for the seizure of fingerprints on less than
full probable cause.164 They would have to
choose between requiring a warrant based
upon full crime and search probable cause or
permitting a warrantless seizure of prints, per-
haps without full probable cause. The choice
might lead a court to excuse prior judicial
approval in a situation where a proper balance
would require such approval, even though tra-
ditional crime and search probable cause are
16- 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
164 Thus, the Supreme Court would be required to
withdraw the dictum in Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S.
721, 738 (1969), which suggested that under a war-
rant, but without full offender or search probable
cause, government agents might validly secure com-
parison fingerprints. [I assume that "full" crime
probable cause is necessary even under the Davis
dictum. See ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 13-1424 (1973).]
1977]
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lacking. 165 The Camara majority, rather than
uphold so rigid a rule, permitted warrants to
issue without crime and search probable cause.
E. Seizures Following Consent Search
A search under a valid consent is permissible
without crime, offender or search probable
cause. The validity of a seizure of an object
discovered in a consent search, however, may
depend upon the probability that the object is
contraband or constitutes evidence of a crime.
The typical consent to search probably would
not be construed to permit the officer to take
and carry away any object which he comes
across in the course of the search. Indeed, one
can argue that a consent to search is ordinarily
not a consent to take even items which have
apparent evidentiary value.
166
Plain view principles, however, can justify
the typical seizure of evidence discovered in
consent searches even where there is no consent
to carry away anything. If an officer, looking
in a place where he has a right to look under
the authority granted by consent, discovers an
object, plain view doctrines allow him to take
and carry away that item if there is probable
cause to believe that it constitutes evidence of a
crime .167
Thus, practical lessons can be learned from
165 As a direct result of the "full" search probable
cause requirement for the issuance of a search war-
rant under traditional theory, some courts-realizing
that no warrant could issue for want of probable
cause-have approved non-emergency warrantless
searches of various types. See, e.g., State v. Chapman,
250 A.2d 203, 211 (Me. 1969), in which the court
approved a warrantless homicide scene search in
part because of the realization that, for want of
search probable cause for some specified item, no
search warrant could issue.
166 Several cases hold that the consenting party can
limit the scope of the search authorized. See, e.g.,
United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126 (7th Cir.
1971); People v. Schmoll, 383 I1. 280, 48 N.E.2d 933
(1943). 1 know of none, however, which decides
whether a search conditioned upon the police agree-
ment to seize nothing would prevent officers from
carrying away contraband or other criminal evidence
discovered during the authorized search. Perhaps
Schmoll, supra, presented this issue, although it is not
clear whether the police came upon the disputed
records while keeping within the limits of the author-
ized search. Nor is it clear whether the police had
seizure probable cause for the records which were
the subject of the controversy.
67 See People v. Stewart, 10 Ill. App. 3d 187, 293
N.E.2d 169 (1973).
a fourfold probable cause analysis in consent
cases. The defense lawyer should remember
that absent a broadly worded consent, officers
cannot in a consent search seize items without
seizure probable cause.16 On the other hand,
prosecutors should keep in mind that once an
officer during a consent search comes across
an object for which seizure probable cause
exists, the breadth of the consent is largely
irrelevant. An effort to revoke the consent at
that point cannot operate to invalidate the
seizure of criminal evidence because such a
seizure is permissible under plain view princi-
ples . 6
9
F. Searches Under the Moving Vehicle Exception
Under the Carroll170 doctrine, as refined in
Chambers v. Maroney..' and interpreted in Texas
v. White, 7 1 without a warrant the police can
curb a moving vehicle and search it if they
have probable cause to believe that a crime has
been committed (crime probable cause) and
probable cause to believe that evidence of that
crime is in the vehicle (search probable cause).
Offender probable cause is irrelevant. Thus a
search under the "moving vehicle" exception is
permissible upon the same amount and kinds
of probable cause necessary to justify the issu-
ance of a search warrant. 73 There is only one
small difference. If an officer has probable
cause to believe that some evidence of an armed
robbery will turn up in a car (perhaps masks or
guns or proceeds), he can stop and search the
car even without probable cause that a particular
item of evidentiary value will be discovered.
On the other hand, because of the specificity
requirement of the warrant clause, a search
warrant cannot issue without probable cause to
believe that a specifically described item is lo-
cated in the place to be searched. 74 Thus, to
"' See People v. Palmer, 26 Ill. 2d 464, 187 N.E.2d
236 (1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 951 (1963), for an
example of a consent search case in which arguably
the defendant should have urged that despite the
consent to search, the seizure was impermissible for
want of seizure probable cause.
169 People v. Gorsuch, 19 Ill. App. 3d 60, 310
N.E.2d 695 (1974).
170 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
171 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
172 423 U.S. 67 (1975). See generally text accompa-
nying notes 56-61 supra.
173 See text accompanying notes 144-64 supra.
174 See text accompanying note 144 supra.
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get prior judicial approval to stop and search a
car, an officer would need more data than is
necessary for a warrantless search under the
Carroll doctrine.
One probable cause question arising under
the Carroll doctrine is the center of a current
dispute. Over the years many decisions have
assumed that if the police have probable cause
to believe that evidence or contraband is some-
where in the vehicle, they can search the entire
vehicle, including the glove compartment and
the trunk. Recently some defense lawyers have
argued that the requisite search probable cause
must relate to the component which is to be
searched. 75 For instance, if following a lawful
traffic stop an officer detects the odor of burn-
ing marijuana, he may not have probable cause
to believe that contraband or other evidence is
in the car's trunk. Some courts have accepted
the argument, holding that the search probable
cause must relate to each separate component
which is to be searched under the Carroll doc-
trine. 176
Litigants can be confused if they forget that
the Carroll doctrine is not the only theory which
can apply to automobile searches. If a police
officer arrests an occupant of a vehicle, under
the doctrine of search incident to arrest, he
can search the area of the vehicle within the
arrestee's reach.17 7 In such a case, the law is
concerned with crime probable cause and of-
fender probable cause. Search probable cause
is wholly irrelevant if the search is incident to a
lawful arrest and is properly confined within
the spatial limits prescribed by Chimel. 178
Thus, talk of the "probable cause" require-
ment in car searches is utterly meaningless
unless we know what type of probability we are
measuring. The fourfold probable cause anal-
ysis again reminds us of the necessity of keep-
ing separate the various fourth amendment
doctrines, each of which has distinct types of
probable cause requirements.
175 See, e.g., People v. Gregg, 43 Cal. App. 3d 137,
117 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1974); Wimberly v. Superior
Court, 16 Cal. 3d 557, 547 P.2d 417, 128 Cal. Rptr.
641 (1976); People v. Blixt, 37 Ill. App. 3d 610, 346
N.E.2d 31 (1976); People v. Kreichman, 45 App.
Div. 2d 697, 357 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1974), rev'd, 37 N.Y.2d
693, 339 N.E.2d 182, 376 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1975).
176 Id.
177 See, e.g., Application of Kiser, 419 F.2d 1134
(8th Cir. 1969). Compare People v. Hendrix, 25 Ill.
App. 3d 339, 323 N.E.2d 505 (1974).
178 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
G. Entries into Homes Without Search Warrants
Several different theories may justify a gov-
ernment agent's entry into a home without a
search warranty a9 Sometimes the entry is per-
missible to effect an arrest. Sometimes it is
necessary to preserve life or health. In limited
circumstances, a warrantless entry may be
proper to prevent the destruction of criminal
evidence. The kinds and the quanta of probabil-
ity required vary with the theory which justifies
the entry. To demonstrate the point, let us
examine the three justifications for entry just
described, recognizing that our list is by no
means exhaustive.
1. Entry to Arrest
An entry into a home to arrest S requires
probable cause to believe that an offense has
been committed (crime probable cause) and
that S has committed it (offender probable
cause). The entry itself, with or without an
arrest warrant, is a search within the meaning
of the fourth amendment.8 0 This suggests a
search probable cause issue. How likely must it
be that the intrusion will bear fruit; that is,
that it will result in the arrest of S? What
probability must there be that S is within the
home?
Most courts hold that to enter a third
person's home to arrest S, the police must have
full probable cause to believe that S is within.""'
Contrary to the assumption of many commen-
tators, however, some courts have held that to
justify an entry into S's home for purposes of
arresting S, the police need much less than full
probable cause to believe he is at home. 2
Indeed, Illinois courts have held that unless
the police know that S is not at home, they can
enter to eliminate the home as a hiding place
before looking elsewhere. sa Other jurisdictions
have required a lesser quantum of search prob-
able cause where the police have obtained an
179 See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
180 See Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 390
(D.C. Cir. 1970); Commonwealth v. Forde, 329 N.E.
2d 717, 722 (Mass. 1975). See generally Rotenberg &
Tanzer, Searching for the Person to be Seized, 35 OHIO
ST. L.J. 56 (1974).
181 See, e.g., Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197
(4th Cir. 1966).
" See Haddad, supra note 36, at 510-14.
18 People v. Sprovieri, 43 Ill. 2d 223, 252 N.E.2d




arrest warrant than in cases where they seek to
make a warrantless arrest.18 4 Perhaps a hot
pursuit entry would also require less search
probable cause than a warrantless entry to
arrest under non-emergency circumstances. 18 5
Whatever the law of a particular jurisdiction
requires, a fourfold probable cause analysis
reminds us to consider whether and to what
degree the likelihood of success (search proba-
ble cause) is a constitutional prerequisite for a
particular type of fourth amendment intrusion.
In the entry-to-arrest cases it suggests an issue
which might otherwise be overlooked.
2. Entry to Preserve Life or Health
When officers enter H's home to preserve
life or health, they need not justify their actions
by pointing to data which demonstrate that a
crime probably has been committed, that H
probably is the offender, or that evidence of
the offense probably is within the home. Crime,
offender and search probable cause, as hereto-
fore discussed, have no place in analyzing a
civil emergency entry. Nevertheless, "civil
emergency" is not a talismanic phrase which
makes unnecessary any calculation of probabil-
ities. In determining the reasonableness of an
emergency entry, among several factors to be
weighed are (1) the probability that an emer-
gency exists, and (2) the probability that the
entry will do some good. 16 The first concept is
different from but analogous to crime probable
cause. The second concept is akin to search
probable cause.
Because emergencies require prompt action,
courts may be reticent to engage in a hindsight
weighing of the probabilities and to criticize
officers for acting on too little data. 187 They
may not demand full probable cause to believe
that life or health was imperiled or that an
emergency entry would prove helpful. Never-
theless courts, no more than counsel, cannot
entirely refuse to consider the probabilities
which were present at the time of the emer-
gency entry.188
184 See Rotenberg & Tanzer, supra note 180, at 57,
65.
181 This assumes that non-emergency entries to
arrest are constitutionally permissible. See note 37
supra.
I8 See People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 347
N.E.2d 607, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976).
187 Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 211-12
(D.C. Cir. 1963).
"' See People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 347
N.E.2d 607, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976).
3. Entry to Prevent Destruction of Evidence
Some courts have held that police officers,
under limited circumstances, can make war-
rantless entries into homes to prevent the de-
struction of criminal evidence. 8 9 Obviously, as
in a search warrant case, we must be concerned
about the probability that a crime has been
committed (crime probable cause) and the
probability that evidence related to the crime is
within the home (search probable cause). Must
the minimum quantum of probable cause re-
quired for such an emergency entry be greater
than, the same as, or less than the probability
required for the issuance of a search warrant?
One view is that, as in the civil emergency
cases, a situation where evidence may be de-
stroyed is a now-or-never emergency where we
cannot demand from the officer a fine calcula-
tion of probabilities. 80 This view would allow
emergency action in quest of evidence on less
data than is required for the issuance of a
search warrant. The contrary view is that a
warrantless invasion of a home to obtain crimi-
nal evidence should be permitted only where
there is a near certainty that the evidence is
within and a very substantial probability that,
absent swift police action, the evidence will be
destroyed. Thus, under this view (1) the re-
quired quantum of search probable cause is
greater in the warrantless entry case than in
warrant cases; and (2) a separate type of prob-
able cause (the probability that the evidence
will otherwise be destroyed) is also required.
In most of the cases which permit warrantless
entries to prevent destruction of evidence, the
facts seem to satisfy the more stringent of the
two views outlined above.' 9'
H. Inventory and Other Administrative Searches
In South Dakota v. Oppermnan,'92 the Supreme
Court held that where police officers have
taken lawful possession of a vehicle, they can
search the car without a warrant under an
inventory search theory. The rationale of the
doctrine-the need to protect the citizen's
property and to discourage false claims of po-
1'9 See note 37 supra and accompanying text.
"' See People v. DiVito, 77 Misc. 2d 463, 353
N.Y.S.2d 990 (1974), which upheld an emergency
intrusion (although not of a house) to seize evidence
upon less than probable cause.
'9' See, e.g., United States v. Guidry, 534 F.2d 1220
(6th Cir. 1976); Thomas v. Parett, 524 F.2d 779 (8th
Cir. 1975); People v. Clark, 547 P.2d 267 (Colo. App.
1975).
1- 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
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lice theft-has nothing to do with efforts to
discover criminal evidence. Thus, it is not sur-
prising that search probable cause, as generally
understood, need not be present to justify an
inventory search. Additionally, where authori-
ties have lawfully taken temporary custody of a
law-abiding citizen's property, as for instance
the vehicle of a motorist suddenly taken ill
while driving alone on a highway, neither crime
nor offender probable cause is a necessary
prerequisite of an inventory search.193
The inventory search is one type of intrusion
among a broader class of administrative intru-
sions which are justified on a rationale that is
unrelated to the need to detect crime, to secure
criminal evidence or to arrest criminals. Others
include searches unlder implied consent regu-
latory schemes, shakedowns of prison cells,
border searches, antihijacking measures uti-
lized at airports, inspections of persons seeking
entrance to public buildings, and a variety of
additional fourth amendment intrusions."
Each doctrine has its separate nuances and
limitations, which often vary from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction. The common element, for pur-
poses of our analysis, is that crime, offender
and search probable cause are unnecessary
because the rationale of the doctrines is some-
thing other than the need to detect crime and
to prosecute criminals.
Sometimes the administrative search ration-
ale also allows authorities to retain, at least
temporarily, the citizen's property without a
showing of seizure probable cause. For in-
stance, an administrative prohibition against
prisoners' keeping currency in their cell may
justify removal of currency found in a cell even
though the inmate's possession violated no
193 See People v. Smith, 44 Ill. 2d 82, 254 NE.2d
492 (1969).I See text accompanying notes 11-27 supra. In
some types of administrative search, the reason for
the search may be the prevention of criminal acts or
acts against the public interest: e.g., even in the
absence of a law which prohibits carrying a toy gun
into a courthouse or onto a plane, security may
demand that such toys be discovered. In other cases,
the purpose is neither to detect nor prevent crime:
e.g., inventory search and search for money in thejail cell. Implied consent regulatory schemes may
have as their justification an intent to safegttard
workers or consumers-even though in many cases
discovered violations could lead to criminal prosecu-
tions. The rationale for these various administrative
searches which justifies a search without probable
cause is some (or some additional) purpose other
than discovery of criminal evidence.
criminal law. On the other hand, in some
situations there is no administrative justification
for the retention of the property. For instance,
if inspection of a woman's purse at a courthouse
entrance reveals nothing which could aid a
prisoner's escape or pose a danger to those
within the building, then the administrative
search rationale does not permit anything in
the purse to be seized. If, however, the inspec-
tion has revealed an item as to which there is
seizure probable cause, since the item has been
discovered in a place where the agent had a
right to look, under traditional plain view the-
ory the contraband or criminal evidence can be
retained.
The fourfold probable cause analysis is prob-
ably less useful to the practicing attorney in
inventory and other administrative search cases
than elsewhere. The analysis, however, does
bring into focus a theoretical concern which
was treated in Part II of this article: the anom-
aly that, under an individual motivation test
for resolving claims of sham use of administra-
tive searches, the more data pointing to search
probable cause, the more likely is a court to
invalidate an administrative search.
19 5
Final Thoughts on Fourfold Probable Cause
The fourfold probable cause analysis could
be applied to a variety of other doctrines which
authorize warrantless intrusions. Attention to
such an analysis may suggest, to both practi-
tioner and theoretician, important issues aris-
ing under these various doctrines. To ask what
type or types and what quantum of probable
cause is necessary to justify any particular
fourth amendment intrusion may not lead us
to every important fourth amendment issue,
but the approach will provide a good beginning
and will quickly bring us to some current prob-
lems as well as some future areas of controversy
in fourth amendment litigation.
CONCLUSION
As indicated at the out.et, my discussions of
the three topics treated herein have a common
origin but no real common theme. To Profes-
sor Fred E. Inbau, I am gratefill for the oppor-
tunity and the encouragement to participate in
the training programs which gave rise to my
ideas. Whatever else is true, I have learned
that a thoughtful effort to present fourth
amendment law in a practical way demands
serious attention to theory.
"' See text accomnpanying notes 99-101 supra.
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